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Abstract
We study the query complexity of cake cutting and give lower and upper bounds for com-
puting approximately envy-free, perfect, and equitable allocations with the minimum number
of cuts. The lower bounds are tight for computing connected envy-free allocations among n = 3
players and for computing perfect and equitable allocations with minimum number of cuts be-
tween n = 2 players. We also formalize moving knife procedures and show that a large subclass
of this family, which captures all the known moving knife procedures, can be simulated efficiently
with arbitrarily small error in the Robertson-Webb query model.
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1 Introduction
We study the classical cake cutting problem due to [Ste48], which captures the division of a hetero-
geneous resource—such as land, time, mineral deposits, fossil fuels, and clean water [Pro13]—among
several parties with equal rights but different interests over the resource. This model has inspired
a rich body of literature in mathematics, political science, economics [RW98, BT96, Mou03] and
more recently computer science [BCE+16] since problems in resource allocation (and fair division in
particular) are central to the design of multiagent systems [CDUE+06]. Many protocols for various
fair division models are now implemented on the Spliddit website [GP14].
Mathematically, the problem is to divide the cake, which is the unit interval, among a set
of n players with valuation functions induced by probability measures over [0, 1]. Given such a
resource, the goal is to compute an allocation of the cake in which every player is content with
the piece received. A major challenge for a third party trying to compute a desirable allocation is
that the preferences of the players are private, and fair allocations can only be found when enough
information is on the table. An example of a cake cutting protocol is Cut-and-Choose, which
dates back to more than 2500 years ago when it appeared in written records in the context of land
division. Cut-and-Choose can be used to obtain an envy-free allocation among two players, such
as Alice and Bob trying to cut a birthday cake with different toppings: First Alice cuts the cake in
two pieces of equal value to her, then Bob picks his favorite and Alice takes the remainder.
More generally, cake cutting protocols operate in a query model (called Robertson-Webb [WS07]),
in which a center that does not know the players asks them questions until it manages to extract
enough information about their preferences to determine a fair division. Two of the prominent
fairness notions, envy-freeness and proportionality, have been the subject of in depth study from
a computational point of view. Proportionality requires that each player gets their fair share of
the resources, which is their total value for the whole cake divided by the number of players, while
envy-freeness is based on social comparison and means no player should want to swap their piece
with anyone else’s. The two notions are not necessarily comparable, since envy-freeness can be triv-
ially achieved by throwing away the entire resource, which is not true for proportionality. However,
when the entire cake must be allocated, envy-freeness implies proportionality and is surprisingly
hard to reach.
The problem of finding an envy-free cake cutting protocol was suggested by [GS58], and solved
by Selfridge and Conway for three players (cca. 1960, see, e.g., [RW98, BT96]) and by Brams
and Taylor 35 years later [BT95] for any number of players. From a computational point of view,
the Brams and Taylor protocol has the major drawback that its runtime can be made arbitrarily
long by setting up the valuations of the players appropriately. In 2016, [AM16] announced a
breakthrough by giving the first bounded envy-free cake cutting protocol for any number of players,
where bounded means that the number of queries is only a function of the number of players, and
not of the valuations.
The query complexity of proportionality is well understood. The problem of computing a pro-
portional allocation with connected pieces can be solved with O(n log n) queries in the Robertson-
Webb model [EP84], with a matching lower bound due to [WS07] for connected pieces that was
extended to any number of pieces by [EP06].
In contrast, for the query complexity of envy-free cake cutting a lower bound of Ω(n2) was
given by [Pro09] and an upper bound of O
(
nn
nn
nn
)
by [AM16]. The bounded algorithm in
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[AM16] outputs highly fragmented allocations, and such resources are generally difficult to handle.
Envy-free allocations with connected pieces do in fact exist for very general valuations 1 (see, e.g.,
[Sim80, Str80, Su99]), but cannot be computed in the Robertson-Webb model [Str08] except for
specific classes such as polynomial functions [Braˆ15].
In light of this impossibility, it makes sense to study the computation of -envy-free allocations
with few cuts. For a general utility model where the valuations are arbitrary functions (not neces-
sarily induced by probability measures), bounds on the query complexity of approximate envy-free
cake cutting with connected pieces were given in [DQS12] together with a proof of PPAD-hardness.
While the problem of computing connected -envy-free allocations is in PPAD [Su99], neither the
computational hardness nor the query lower and upper bounds in [DQS12] carry over (or are close
to tight) in the usual cake cutting model, which leaves wide open the question of understanding
the complexity of this problem.
Aside from proportionality and envy-freeness, a third notion of fairness is known as equitability,
in which each player must receive a piece worth the same value. Equitable and proportional
allocations with connected pieces were shown to exist by Cechlarova, Dobos, and Pillarova [CDP13].
The computational complexity of approximate equitability was investigated by Cechlarova and
Pillarova, who gave an upper bound of O
(
n
(
log n+ log −1
))
for computing an -equitable and
proportional allocation with connected pieces for any number of players, and by [PW17] who
showed a lower bound of Ω
(
log −1/ log log −1
)
for finding an -equitable allocation (not necessarily
connected) for any number of players.
More stringent fairness requirements are also possible, such as (i) the necklace splitting problem,
for which the existence of fair solutions was established by [Ney46], with a bound on the number of
cuts given by [Alo87], (ii) the more general notion of exact division 2, which generalizes necklace
splitting and was shown to exist by [DS61], and (iii) the competitive equilibrium from equal
incomes, the existence of which was determined by [Wel85]. The necklace splitting problem is
contained in PPA and in fact is PPAD-hard [FRG18]. A well known instantiation of the necklace
splitting solution is that of perfect allocations, which are simultaneously proportional, envy-free,
and equitable.
The complexity and existence of various fairness concepts in cake cutting and related models,
such as cake cutting where the resource is a chore, pie cutting, multiple homogeneous goods,
multiple discrete goods was studied in [CDG+17, OPR16, AMNS15, Bud11, GZH+11, DFHY18,
BHM15, BJK08, CKKK12, PR18, BCE+17, AFG+17, BLM16].
1.1 Our Contribution
In this paper we study the query complexity of cake cutting in the standard Robertson-Webb
(RW) query model [WS07] for several fairness notions: envy-free, perfect, and equitable allocations
with the minimum number of cuts. Such allocations are known to exist on any instance, but
several impossibility results preclude their computation in the standard query model [Str08, CP12].
Nevertheless, the computation of approximately fair solutions is possible and we state a general
simulation result implying that for each  > 0, a number of queries that is polynomial in n and
1Such allocations exist even for valuations not induced by probability measures (see, e.g., [Sim80], [Str80] for a
proof based on a topological lemma on intersection of sets, and [Su99] for a proof using Sperner’s lemma).
2The problem of exact division is the following: given a cake with n players and target non-negative weights
w1 . . . wk, find a partition A = (A1, . . . , Ak) such that Vi(Aj) = wj for each player i and every piece Aj .
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1/ suffices to find -fair allocations for several fairness concepts, such as O(n/) for connected
envy-free and O(n(k − 1)/) for (, k)-measure splittings.
Our first main contribution is to give lower bounds for the problems of computing approximately
fair allocations (with deterministic protocols), showing that finding (i) an -envy-free allocation
with connected pieces among three players, (ii) a connected -equitable allocation for two players,
and (iii) an -perfect allocation with two cuts for two players requires Ω
(
log 1
)
queries. The lower
bounds for envy-freeness and perfect allocations are the first query lower bounds for these problems.
Also, the lower bound for envy-free allocations extends to any number of players. The main idea
underpinning these results is that of maintaining a self-reducible structure throughout the execution
of a protocol, which may be useful more generally for obtaining other lower bounds.
We also give improved upper bounds for these fairness notions, which in the case of envy-freeness
for three players and perfect allocations for two players are O(log 1 ) and rely on approximately
simulating in the RW model two moving knife procedures, due to [BB04] and [Aus82], respectively.
An upper bound of O
(
log 1
)
for computing a connected -equitable allocation for two players was
given by [CP12]. The upper bounds do not assume any restrictions on the valuations.
A summary of our bounds for the query complexity of computing fair allocations can be found
in Table 1, together with those from previous literature.
Fairness notion Players Upper bound Lower bound
-envy-free (connected)
n = 2 1 1
n = 3 O(log −1) (∗) Ω(log −1) (∗)
n ≥ 4 O(n/) (∗) Ω (log −1) (∗)
-perfect (min cuts)
n = 2 O(log −1) (∗) Ω(log −1) (∗)
n ≥ 3 O (n3/) [BM15] Ω( log −1
log log −1
)
[PW17]
-equitable (connected)
n = 2 O(log −1) [CP12] Ω(log −1) (∗)
n ≥ 3 O (n (log n+ log −1)) [CP12] Ω( log −1
log log −1
)
[PW17]
envy-free (exact) n ≥ 2 O
(
nn
nn
nn
)
[AM16] Ω(n2) [Pro09]
proportional (exact) n ≥ 2 O (n log n) [EP84] Ω(n log n) [WS07, EP06]
Table 1: Query complexity in cake cutting in the standard query model. Our results are marked
with (∗). The lower bounds for finding -perfect and -equitable allocations for n ≥ 3 players hold
for any number of cuts [PW17]. The bounds for exact envy-free and proportional allocations hold
for any number of cuts, except the upper bound for proportional works for connected pieces.
Our second main contribution is to formalize the class of moving knife procedures, which was
previously viewed as disjoint from the RW query model. Using this definition, we show that any
fair moving knife procedure with a fixed number of players and devices can be simulated in O(log 1 )
queries in the RW model when the players have value densities that are bounded from above by a
constant. This simulation immediately implies that all the known moving knife procedures, such
as the procedures designed by Austin, Barbanel-Brams, Webb [Web78], and Brams-Taylor-Zwicker
[BTZ97], can be simulated efficiently within -error in the RW model when the measures of the
players are bounded. In this context we also give a moving knife procedure for computing connected
equitable allocations for any number of players.
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2 Model
The resource (cake) is represented as the interval [0, 1]. There is a set of players N = {1, . . . , n}
interested in the cake, such that each player i ∈ N is endowed with a private valuation function
Vi that assigns a value to every subinterval of [0, 1]. These values are induced by a non-negative
integrable value density function vi, so that for an interval I, Vi(I) =
∫
x∈I vi(x) dx. The valuations
are additive, so Vi
(⋃m
j=1 Ij
)
=
∑m
j=1 Vi(Ij) for any disjoint intervals I1, . . . , Im ⊆ [0, 1]. The value
densities are non-atomic, and in fact sets of measure zero are worth zero to a player. Without loss
of generality, the valuations are normalized to Vi([0, 1]) = 1, for all i = 1 . . . n.
A piece of cake is a finite union of disjoint intervals. A piece is connected if it consists of a
single interval. An allocation A = (A1, . . . , An) is a partition of the cake among the players, such
that each player i receives the piece Ai, the pieces are disjoint, and
⋃
i∈N Ai = [0, 1].
We say that a value density v is: (i) hungry if v(x) > 0 for all x ∈ [0, 1], (ii) uniform on
an interval [a, b] if v(x) = 1 for all x ∈ [a, b], and (iii) bounded on interval [a, b] if there exists a
constant D > 0 such that v(x) ≥ D for all x ∈ [a, b] (or simply bounded if a = 0 and b = 1). We
will sometimes to refer to a valuation (or player) as hungry to simply mean that the corresponding
density is strictly positive.
2.1 Fairness Notions
An allocation A is said to be proportional if Vi(Ai) ≥ 1/n for all i ∈ N ; envy-free if Vi(Ai) ≥ Vi(Aj)
for all i, j ∈ N ; perfect if Vi(Aj) = 1/n for all i, j ∈ N ; equitable if Vi(Ai) = c, for all i ∈ N
and some value c ∈ [0, 1]. In addition to allocations, we will refer to partitions as divisions of the
cake into pieces where the number of pieces need not equal the number of players. A partition
A = (A1, . . . , Ak) is said to be a k-measure splitting if Vi(Aj) = 1/k for each player i and piece Aj .
Envy-free allocations with connected pieces and equitable allocations with connected pieces
always exist [Su99, CDP13], while k-measure splittings exist with n(k − 1) cuts [Alo87].
We will also be interested in -fair division, where the fairness constraints are satisfied within
-error; for instance, an allocation A is -envy-free if Vi(Ai) ≥ Vi(Aj)− , for each i, j = 1 . . . n, and
an (, k) measure splitting if Vi(Aj) ∈ (1/k − , 1/k + ) for each i = 1 . . . n, j = 1 . . . k.
More generally, we consider an abstract definition for fairness notions that admit approximate
versions as follows.
Definition 1 (Abstract fairness). A fairness notion F must satisfy the following condition:
• Let A = (A1, . . . , An) be any allocation that is F-fair with respect to some valuations v =
(v1 . . . vn). Then for any  > 0 and valuations v
′ = (v′1 . . . v′n), if |Vi(Aj) − V ′i (Aj)| ≤ /2,
∀i, j = 1 . . . n, then it must be the case that the allocation A is -F-fair with respect to
valuations v′.
Proportionality, envy-freeness, and perfection are instantiations of this notion of abstract fair-
ness. For example, if an allocation A is envy-free with respect to some valuations v, then A is also
-envy-free for valuations v′ that are close to v.
2.2 Query Complexity
All the discrete cake cutting protocols operate in a query model known as the Robertson-Webb
model (see, e.g., the book of [RW98]), which was explicitly stated by [WS07]. In this model, the
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protocol communicates with the players using the following types of queries:
• Cuti(α): Player i cuts the cake at a point y where Vi([0, y]) = α, where α ∈ [0, 1] is chosen
arbitrarily by the center 3. The point y becomes a cut point.
• Evali(y): Player i returns Vi([0, y]), where y is a previously made cut point.
An RW protocol asks the players a sequence of cut and evaluate queries, at the end of which
it outputs an allocation demarcated by cut points from its execution (i.e. cuts discovered through
queries). Note that the value of a piece [x, y] can be determined with two Eval queries, Evali(x)
and Evali(y).
A second class of protocols is known as “moving-knife” (or continuous) procedures, which
typically involve sliding multiple knives across the cake, while evaluating the players’ valuations
until some stopping condition is met. This class has not been formalized until now. Examples of
such procedures include Austin’s procedure, which computes a perfect allocation for two players,
Stromquist’s procedure, for finding a connected envy-free allocation for three players, and Dubins-
Spanier, for computing a proportional allocation for any number of players. The latter is the only
moving knife procedure that can be simulated exactly in the RW model.
3 Simulation of Partitions
A general technique useful for computing approximately fair allocations in the RW model is based
on asking the players to submit a discretization of the cake in many small cells via Cut queries,
and reassembling them offline in a way that satisfies approximately the desired solution. The
next statement implies that it is possible to approximate in the RW model allocations that exist
with a bounded number of cuts, which implies upper bounds for computing approximately fair
solutions for several fairness concepts; the proof can be found in Appendix A. The difference from
[BBKP14], where discretizations are used to simulate bounded algorithms, is that here we do not
restrict ourselves to properties that are computable by an RW protocol 4.
Lemma 1. Consider a cake cutting problem for n players. Suppose there exists a partition A =
(A1, . . . , Am), where each piece Aj is demarcated with at most K cuts
5 and worth wi,j to each
player i. Then for all  > 0, a partition A˜ = (A˜1, . . . , A˜m) where each piece Aj is demarcated with
at most K cuts and |Vi(A˜j)− wi,j | ≤  for all i, j can be found with O(K · n/) queries.
As a corollary, we get bounds for computing approximately fair allocations in the RW model.
Corollary 1. For each  > 0 and number of players n with arbitrary value densities, a partition
that is
• -envy-free and connected can be computed with O(n/) queries
• -equitable, proportional, and connected can be computed with O(n/) queries
• an (, k)-measure splitting with k pieces can be computed with O(k · n2/) queries.
• -perfect can be computed with O(n3/) queries.
3Ties are resolved deterministically, using for example the leftmost point with this property.
4In fact, in our case a solution with a required property as in [BBKP14] need not even exist on all instances.
5A connected piece X = [a, b] is demarcated by two cuts (namely its endpoints a, b), a piece X ′ = [a, b] ∪ [c, d]
where a < b < c < d is demarcated with four cuts (a, b, c, d), and so on. We are interested in the minimum number
of points that can be used to demarcate a piece.
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4 Envy-Free Allocations
Exact connected envy-free allocations are guaranteed to exist (see, e.g., [Str80], Su [Su99]), but can-
not be computed by finite RW protocols ( [Str08]). However, the impossibility result of Stromquist
does not explain how many queries are needed to obtain connected -envy-free allocations.
From Corollary 1, a connected -envy-free allocation can be computed with O(n/) queries.
As we show next, fewer queries are needed for three players. The proof relies on approximately
computing the outcome of a moving knife procedure due to [BB04]. The proof must handle the
fact that a discrete RW protocol does not allow the center to cut the cake directly, so the simulation
has to search for the position of the “sword” in the Barbanel-Brams protocol by keeping track of a
small interval that must be made very small from the perspective of each player. The details can
be found in Appendix B together with all the omitted proofs of this section.
Theorem 4.1. A connected -envy-free allocation for three players can be computed with O
(
log 1
)
queries.
Our main result in this section is a matching lower bound for this problem.
Theorem 4.2. Computing a connected -envy-free allocation for three players requires Ω
(
log 1
)
queries.
We note that in general there are many envy-free allocations so the proof must ensure that for a
long enough time none of these solutions are near. We will start from a family of valuations known
as “rigid measure systems” [Str08], which were studied in the context of showing that no exact
connected envy-free allocation can be computed in general in the RW model. The difficulty is that
while in [Str08] it was sufficient to avoid a single point in order for the protocol to not be able to
find an exact envy-free solution with one more query, here we must avoid an entire interval and
fit the valuations accordingly in order for an approximately envy-free solution to remain far away
after one more query. Towards this end, we will make a self reducible structure from a generalized
version of this class of valuations, which will then be used to give the required lower bound. We
first slightly generalize rigid measure systems to allow a different parameter ti for each player i.
Definition 2. A tuple of value densities (v1, . . . , vn) is a generalized rigid measure system if:
• the density of each measure is bounded by: 1√
2
< vi(x) <
√
2, for all i = 1 . . . n and x ∈ [0, 1].
• there exist points 0 = x0 < x1 < . . . < xn−1 < xn = 1 and values si, ti for each player i
such that 0 < si < 1/n < ti < 1/2 and the valuations of the players satisfy the constraints:
Vj(xj−1, xj) = Vj(xj , xj+1) = tj for all j = 1 . . . n− 1 and Vn(xn−1, xn) = Vn(0, x1) = tn.
An example can be found in Appendix B. Generalized rigid measure systems satisfy the property
that the valuations of the players for any given piece cannot differ too much.
Lemma 2. Consider any cake cutting problem where for two players i and j where there exist
a, b > 0 such that for all x ∈ [0, 1], 1/a < vi(x) < b and 1/a < vj(x) < b. Then for any two pieces
S1, S2 of the cake, if Vi(S1) ≥ ab · Vi(S2), it follows that ab · Vj(S1) > Vj(S2).
A useful notion to measure how close a protocol is to discovering an approximately envy-free
solution on a given instance will be that of a partial rigid measure system, which we define for three
players; the n > 3 definition works similarly.
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Definition 3. A tuple of value densities (v1, v2, v3) is a partial rigid measure system if
• the density of each player i is bounded everywhere: 1√
2
< vi(x) <
√
2, for all x ∈ [0, 1].
• there exist values k > 0 and 1/2 > `i > 1/3 > mi > 0 for each player i, and points
x, x′, y, y′ ∈ [0, 1], so that the matrix of valuations for pieces demarcated by these points is:
[0, x] [x, x′] [x′, y] [y, y′] [y′, 1]
V1 `1 k `1 k m1
V2 m2 k `2 k `2
V3 `3 k m3 k `3
Partial rigid measure systems have the property that if there is a collection of cut points
P = {z1, . . . , zk} ⊂ [0, 1], such that there are no points from P in the intervals (x, x′) and (y, y′),
then any connected partition attainable using cut points from P has envy at least 0.01k.
Lemma 3. Let (v1, v2, v3) be a partial rigid measure system with parameters k,mi, `i so that for
each i, Vi([x, x
′]) = Vi([y, y′]) = k for some x, x′, y, y′. If P = {z1, . . . , zt} ⊂ [0, 1] is a collection
of cut points such that x, x′, y, y′ ∈ P and there are no points from P in the intervals (x, x′) and
(y, y′), then any connected partition demarcated by points in P has envy at least 0.01k.
Next we show how queries can be answered one at a time so that the valuations remain consistent
with (some) partial rigid measure system throughout the execution of a protocol.
Lemma 4. Suppose that at some point during the execution of an RW protocol for three players the
valuations and cuts discovered are consistent with a partial rigid measure system with parameters
k > 0, 0 < mi < 1/3 < `i < 1/2 for each i, and points x, y, so that the valuations are:
If the intervals I = [x, x+ k] and J = [y, y+ k] have no cut points inside, then a new cut query
can be answered so that the valuations remain consistent with a partial rigid measure system where
two new intervals I ′ ⊆ I and J ′ ⊆ J have no cuts inside, length 0.01k, and the densities of all the
players are uniform on I ′, J ′.
Proof. (of Theorem 4.2) Set the initial configuration to a partial rigid measure system with k = 0.01,
`i = 0.35, mi = 0.28 for each player i. Declare initial cuts at 0.34, 0.35, 0.67, 0.68 and set the
intervals I = [0.34, 0.35] and J = [0.67, 0.68] (see Table 2 in Appendix B). It can be verified there
exist compatible valuations for which the densities are in (1/
√
2,
√
2).
By iteratively applying Lemma 4 with every Cut query, a protocol discovers with every cut
query a partial rigid system, where the intervals I and J always have uniform density, and their
length cannot be diminished by a factor larger than 100 in each iteration. By Lemma 2, if a
protocol encounters a partial rigid measure system for which there are no cuts inside I and J ,
where |I| = |J | = k, then any configuration attainable with the existing cuts leads to envy of at
least 0.01k. To get -envy, we need k/100 < , and so the number of queries is Ω
(
log 1
)
.
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The construction can be extended to give a lower bound for any number of players.
Theorem 4.3. Computing a connected -envy-free allocation for n ≥ 3 players requires Ω (log 1 )
queries.
The lower bound of Ω
(
log 1
)
is in fact tight for the class of generalized rigid measure systems,
for any (fixed) number of players. We show an upper bound of O
(
log 1
)
for this class by designing
a moving knife procedure and then simulating it in the discrete RW model.
Theorem 4.4. For the class of generalized rigid measure systems, a connected -envy-free allocation
can be computed with O
(
log 1
)
queries for any fixed number n of players.
5 Perfect Allocations
As mentioned in Corollary 1, -perfect allocations with the minimum number of cuts can be com-
puted with O(n3/) queries. For n = 2 players, the problem of computing -perfect allocations can
be solved more efficiently by simulating Austin’s moving procedure in the RW model. The proofs
for this section are in Appendix C.
Theorem 5.1. An -perfect allocation for two players can be computed with O(log 1 ) queries.
As we show next, this bound is optimal.
Theorem 5.2. Computing an -perfect allocation with the minimum number of cuts for two players
requires Ω
(
log 1
)
queries.
We prove the lower bound by maintaining throughout the execution of any protocol two intervals
in which the cuts of the perfect allocation must be situated, such that the distance to a perfect
partition cannot decrease too much with any cut query.
Lemma 5. Let  > 0. Consider a two player instance consistent with Figure 1, where
1.  < 0.001 min{a, d}.
2. any allocation obtained with cuts 0 < k < ` < 1 that is -perfect from the point of view of
player 1 is worth to player 2 less than 0.5−d/100− when k < x and more than 0.5+d/100+
when k > x+ a.
3. there are no cut points inside the intervals I = [x, x+ a] and J = [y, y + a].
Figure 1: Construction for perfect. Player 1 has uniform density everywhere; y = x + 0.5, 0 <
a, d ≤ 0.1, x, b, c, e > 0, x+ a+ b = 0.5 and c+ 2d+ e = 0.5.
Then a new query can be handled so that the valuations remain consistent with Figure 1, such
that conditions 2 and 3 still hold with respect to intervals I ′ = [x′, x′ + a′], J ′ = [y′, y′ + a′] and
parameters x′, a′ = a/100, and d′ = d/100.
By iteratively applying Lemma 5 with every cut query received from a suitably chosen starting
configuration, we will obtain that the number of rounds is Ω
(
log 1
)
, implying Theorem 5.2.
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6 Equitable Allocations
Cechlarova, Dobos, and Pillarova [CDP13] showed that for any number of players and any order,
there exists a connected equitable allocation in that order. Moreover, the equitable allocation is
proportional for some order. We give a tight lower bound on the number of queries required for
finding connected -equitable allocations; an upper bound was given in [CP12].
Theorem 6.1 ([CP12]). For any fixed number n of players, a connected -equitable and proportional
allocation can be computed with O(log 1 ) queries.
Theorem 6.2. Computing a connected -equitable allocation for two players requires Ω
(
log 1
)
queries.
For two hungry players, the connected equitable and proportional allocation is unique.
Lemma 6. For two players with hungry valuations, the cut point of the equitable allocation is
unique.
Proof. A unique equitable allocation exists for each order of the players [CDP13]. Let x be the
cut point of the equitable allocation when the player order is (1, 2). Then there exists c such that
V1(0, x) = V2(x, 1) = c, and so V2(0, x) = V1(x, 1) = 1 − c. Thus the cut point of the equitable
allocation is the same for each order of the players.
Next we show that when the valuations of the players are as in the next table and no cuts may
be used from the interval (x, y), the distance from a connected equitable allocation is high.
Figure 2: Construction for equitable lower bound. The distance from a connected equitable and
proportional allocation is b− a, where 0 < a < b < 0.5 and 0 < x < y < 1.
Lemma 7. Consider a two player problem where there exist points 0 < x < y < 1 and values
0 < a < b < 0.5 such that the valuations are consistent with Figure 2, where V1(0, x) = 0.5 + a =
V2(y, 1), V2(x, 1) = 0.5 + b = V1(0, y). Then any connected allocation that can be formed with cut
points outside the interval (x, y) has distance at least b− a from equitability.
Proof. Consider first allocations that can be obtained by cutting at x. If the player order is (1, 2),
then |V1(0, x)− V2(x, 1)| = |(0.5 + a)− (0.5 + b)| = b− a. Moreover, for any point 0 < z < x, the
order (1, 2) gives player 1 less than w+ a and player 2 more than w+ b, which leads to distance at
least b−a from equitability. On the other hand, if the player order is (2, 1), then V2(0, x) = 0.5− b,
while V1(x, 1) = 0.5− a. This allocation has distance |V2(0, x)− V1(x, 1)| = b− a from equitability.
The distance only increases for any cut z < x, since |V2(0, z) − V1(z, 1)| = V1(z, 1) − V2(0, z) >
(0.5− a)− (0.5− b) = b− a.
Similarly, if the cut is at y, then the player order (1, 2) gives distance |V1(0, y) − V2(y, 1)| =
|(0.5 + b)− (0.5 + a)| = b− a. For any cut point z > y, the distance only increases, since a < b and
player 1 gets more than 0.5 + b, while player 2 gets less than 0.5 + a. Finally, if the player order is
(2, 1), the cut point y leads to distance |V2(0, y) − V1(y, 1)| = |(0.5 − a) − (0.5 − b)| = b − a. For
any cut point z > y, |V2(0, z)− V1(z, 1)| = V2(0, z)− V1(z, 1) > (0.5− a)− (0.5− b) = b− a.
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Given such a configuration, queries can be handled in a way that preserves the symmetry and
the distance to equitability gets reduced by a constant factor.
Lemma 8. Consider a two player problem where there exist points 0 < x < y < 1 and values
0 < a < b < 0.5 such that V1(0, x) = 0.5 + a = V2(y, 1), V2(x, 1) = 0.5 + b = V1(0, y). Then
any Cut query (addressed to either player) can be answered so that the new configuration has two
new points z < t such that z, t ∈ (x, y), the valuations satisfy V1(0, z) = 0.5 + a′ = V2(t, 1),
V2(z, 1) = 0.5 + b
′ = V1(0, t), and b′ − a′ ≥ (b− a)/100.
Proof. Suppose that player 1 receives a cut query Cut1(α). If α < 0.5 + a or α > 0.5 + b, then
answer for both players in a way that is consistent with the history (e.g. uniform on the interval
where the unique point determined by the answer of player 1 to the query falls). Otherwise, define
new cuts z, t such that x < z < t < y and consider two subcases:
• α ∈ (0.5 + a, 0.5 + (a+ b)/2 ]. Let a′ = (a+b)/2+(b−a)/100 and b′ = (a+b)/2+(b−a)/50.
Then a < (a+ b)/2 < a′ < b′ < b.
• α ∈ (0.5 + (a+ b)/2, α < 0.5 + b). Let a′ = (a+b)/2− (b−a)/50, b′ = (a+b)/2− (b−a)/100.
Then a < a′ < b′ < (a+ b)/2 < b.
In both cases, b′ − a′ = (b− a)/100. Set V1(0, z) = 0.5 + a′, V2(0, z) = 0.5− b′, V1(0, t) = 0.5 + b′,
and V2(0, t) = 0.5− a′. In the first case, the answer to the query falls to the left of z and the value
can be set in any way consistent with the total value of player 2 for [x, z], while in the second case
the cut point falls to the right of t and can similarly be handled arbitrarily on [t, y]. Afterwards,
fit the value of player 1 for the generated cut point in a way that is consistent with its valuation
for [0, z] and [0, t].
If player 2 receives instead a cut query Cut2(α), then when α < 0.5 − b or α > 0.5 − a, the
query can be answered arbitrarily in a way that is consistent with the history. Otherwise, define
cuts z, t such that x < z < t < y and consider the subcases:
• α ∈ (0.5− b, 0.5− (a+ b)/2 ]. Let a′ = (a+b)/2− (b−a)/50 and b′ = (a+b)/2− (b−a)/100.
Then a < a′ < b′ < (a+ b)/2 < b and 0.5− (a+ b)/2 < 0.5− b′.
• α ∈ (0.5− (a+ b)/2, α < 0.5− a). Consider values a′ = (a + b)/2 + (b − a)/100, b′ = (a +
b)/2 + (b− a)/50. Then a < (a+ b)/2 < a′ < b′ < b and 0.5− a′ < 0.5− (a+ b)/2.
We have b′ − a′ = (b − a)/100 and the valuations of players 1 and 2 for the pieces [0, z] and [0, t]
can be defined as in case 1, when player 1 received the Cut query.
The proof of Theorem 6.2 follows from the previous lemmas.
Proof. (of Theorem 6.2) Start with cut points x = 0.4, y = 0.6, and values a = 0.05, b = 0.06, such
that V1(0, x) = 0.55, V2(0, x) = 0.44, V1(0, y) = 0.56, V2(0, y) = 0.45. By Lemma 7, the distance
to an equitable and proportional allocation by using cuts outside (x, y) is at least b− a = 0.01. By
applying Lemma 8 with every Cut query received, we get that the distance is reduced by a factor
of 100 in every round. For -equitability to hold in round k, the condition 0.01/100k ≤  must be
met, and so the number of rounds is Ω
(
log 1
)
.
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7 Moving Knife Protocols
We will consider a family of protocols that seems to, on one hand, capture all types of protocols
that have so far been called “moving knife” procedures and, on the other hand, be simple enough
for a transparent simulation. An important ingredient of the definition is that knife positions
must be continuous. To ensure that “cut queries” fall within the definition, we will only require
continuity for hungry valuation functions. The formal definition together with the omitted proofs
of this section can be found in Appendix D.
Theorem 7.1. Consider a cake cutting problem where the value densities are bounded from above
and below by strictly positive constants. Let M be an RW moving knife protocol with at most r
steps, such that M outputs F-fair allocations demarcated by at most a constant number C of cuts.
Then for each  > 0, there is an RW protocol M that uses O
(
log 1
)
queries and computes
-F-fair partitions demarcated with at most C cuts.
Theorem 7.2. The Austin, Austin’s extension, Barbanel-Brams, Stromquist, Webb, Brams-Taylor-
Zwicker, and Saberi-Wang moving knife procedures can be simulated with O
(
log 1
)
RW queries
when the value densities are bounded from above and below by positive constants.
An Equitable Protocol: Next we show a simple moving knife protocol in the Robertson-Webb
model for computing equitable allocations for any number of hungry players. A more complex
moving knife procedure for computing exact equitable allocations that is not in the RW model but
works even when the valuations are not hungry was discovered independently by [SHS17].
Equitable Protocol : Player 1 slides a knife continuously across the cake, from 0 to 1. For
each position x1 of the knife, player 1 is asked for its value of the piece [0, x1]; then each player
i = 2 . . . n iteratively positions its own knife at a point xi ∈ [xi−1, 1] with Vi(xi−1, xi) = V1(0, x1) if
possible, and at xi = 1 otherwise.
Player n shouts “Stop!” when its own knife reaches the right endpoint of the cake (i.e., xn = 1).
The cake is allocated in the order 1 . . . n, with cuts at x1 . . . xn−1.
Theorem 7.3. There is is an RW moving knife protocol that computes a connected equitable allo-
cation for any number n of hungry players.
This immediately implies a moving knife protocol for computing an allocation that is not only
equitable, but also proportional; this can be achieved by running Equitable Protocol for every
permutation of the players and choosing the one that is proportional.
8 The Stronger and Weaker Models
We also discuss two other query models; the proofs for this section are in Appendix E.
The first one, which we call RW+, is stronger in that the inputs to evaluate queries need not
be previous cut points and at the end the protocol can use arbitrary points (i.e. not just cuts
discovered through queries) to demarcate the final allocation.
Definition 4 (RW+ query model). An RW+ protocol for cake cutting communicates with the
players via two types of queries:
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• Cuti(α): Player i cuts the cake at a point y where Vi([0, y]) = α, for any α ∈ [0, 1].
• Evali(y): Player i returns Vi([0, y]), for any y ∈ [0, 1].
At the end of execution an RW+ protocol outputs an allocation that can be demarcated by any
points of its choice, regardless of whether they have been discovered through queries or not.
The RW+ model differs from the RW model in subtle ways. For instance, in RW there exists a
characterization of truthful protocols (i.e. all truthful protocols are dictatorships for n = 2 players,
with a similar statement for n ≥ 3 players [BM15]). A similar characterization is not known in
the RW+ model. However the RW+ model allows a general simulation of moving knife protocols
without requiring that valuations are bounded from below. Our constructions for the lower bounds
work against this stronger query model.
Clearly the discretization technique in Section 3 still applies, and so do the upper bounds from
there for RW+ protocols. We get that in fact the lower bounds hold too since our constructions did
not use in any crucial way the fact that the evaluate inputs must come from previous cut queries.
Corollary 2. Computing a connected -envy-free allocation among n = 3 players, an -perfect
allocation with two cuts between n = 2 players, and a connected -equitable allocation between
n = 2 players in the RW+ models requires Θ(log 1 ) queries. Computing a connected -envy-free
allocation for any fixed number n of players requires Ω(log 1 ) queries.
In the RW+ model we can simulate moving knife protocols without the requirement that the
valuations are bounded from below since the center can reduce (half) the time directly with each
iteration, instead of reducing it through the lens of the players’ valuations.
Theorem 8.1. Consider a cake cutting problem where the value densities are bounded from above
by constant D > 0. Let M be an RW+ moving knife protocol with at most r steps, such that M
outputs F-fair allocations demarcated by at most a constant number C of cuts.
Then for each  > 0, there is an RW+ protocol M that uses O
(
log 1
)
queries and computes
-F-fair partitions demarcated with at most C cuts.
We also introduce a weaker model, which we call RW−, where the protocol can ask the players
only the evaluate type of query.
Definition 5 (RW− query model). An RW− protocol for cake cutting communicates with the
players via queries of the form
• Evali(y): Player i returns Vi([0, y]), where y ∈ [0, 1] is arbitrarily chosen by the center.
At the end an RW− protocol outputs an allocation that can be demarcated by any points.
If the valuations are arbitrary, then an RW− protocol may be unable to find any fair allocation
at all. The reason is that no matter what queries an RW− protocol asks, one can hide the entire
instance in a small interval that has value 1 for all the players; this interval will shrink as more
queries are issued, but can be set to remain of non-zero length until the end of execution.
However, if the valuations are bounded from above6, then an RW− protocol is quite powerful.
6There exist other types of valuations on which the RW− model may be useful, such as piecewise constant
valuations defined on a grid, with the demarcations between intervals of different height known to the protocol.
13
Theorem 8.2. Suppose the valuations of the players are bounded from above by a constant D > 0.
Then any RW+ query can be answered within -error using O(log 1 ) RW
− queries.
Proof. Let there be an instance with arbitrary valuations v1 . . . vn such that vi(x) < D for all
x ∈ [0, 1] and i ∈ N . Since an RW− protocol can use the same type of evaluate queries as an
RW+ protocol, the simulation has to handle the case where the incoming query is a cut. Let
this be Cuti(α) and denote by x the correct answer to the query. In order to find an approximate
answer using only evaluate queries, initialize ` = 0, r = 1, and search for the correct answer: (∗) Let
m = (`+r)/2. Ask player i the query Evali(m) and let w be the answer given. If |w−α| ≤ , return
m. Otherwise, if m > α, set r = m, and if m < α, set ` = m; return to (∗). This procedure halves
the interval [`, r] with every iteration. Moreover, from the bound on the valuations, an interval
of length /D cannot be worth more than  to any player. Thus the search stops in O(log 1 )
rounds.
9 Discussion
An important open question is to obtain stronger lower bounds for n ≥ 4 players for computing
connected envy-free allocations and for n ≥ 3 players for perfect allocations with minimal number
of cuts. We conjecture that unlike equitability, which remains logarithmic in 1/ for any number of
players, computing a connected -envy-free allocation for n = 4 players and an -perfect allocation
with minimal cuts for n = 3 players will require Ω(1 ) queries. Since moving knife protocols can
be simulated with O(log 1 ) queries, this would imply that no moving knife protocol exists for
computing an envy-free allocation for n ≥ 4 players or a perfect allocation for n ≥ 3 players (the
existence of such procedures has been posed as an open question, e.g. in [BTZ97]).
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A Simulation of Partitions
A general technique useful for computing approximately fair allocations in the RW model is based
on asking the players to submit a discretization of the cake in many small cells via Cut queries,
and reassembling them offline in a way that satisfies approximately the desired solution. The next
theorem statement implies that it is possible to approximate in the RW model allocations that
exist with a bounded number of cuts, which implies upper bounds for computing approximately
fair solutions for several fairness concepts.
Lemma 1 (restated) Consider a cake cutting problem for n players. Suppose there exists a partition
A = (A1, . . . , Am), where each piece Aj is demarcated with at most K cuts
7 and worth wi,j to each
player i. Then for all  > 0, a partition A˜ = (A˜1, . . . , A˜m) where each piece Aj is demarcated with
at most K cuts and |Vi(A˜j)− wi,j | ≤  for all i, j can be found with O(K · n/) queries.
Proof. Let 0 < x1 < . . . < xT < 1 be the minimum set of points required to demarcate the partition
A = (A1, . . . , Am) and consider the RW protocol:
7A connected piece X = [a, b] is demarcated by two cuts (namely its endpoints a, b), a piece X ′ = [a, b] ∪ [c, d]
where a < b < c < d is demarcated with four cuts (a, b, c, d), and so on. We are interested in the minimum number
of points that can be used to demarcate a piece.
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• Ask each player i a number of B = d4K/e Cut queries to partition the cake in B intervals
each worth 1/B to i.8
• For each partition A˜ = (A˜1, . . . , A˜m) that can be attained by assembling offline the resulting
n ·B cells in m pieces, each demarcated by at most K cut points:
 Let ui,j be the value of player i for the pieceA′j obtained by rounding the cuts demarcating
A˜j to player i’s own cut points. If ui,j ∈ [wi,j − /2, wi,j + /2] for all i, j, then output
A˜ and exit.
To see that existence of such a partition A˜ is guaranteed, note that by rounding the points x1 . . . xT
to the nearest point on the grid submitted by the players and allocating from left to right the
resulting intervals in the same order as in A (including empty pieces if rounded cuts overlap), we
obtain a partition A˜ in which every piece is demarcated with at most K cuts. The rounding error
from each point is 1/B, thus the overall difference for any piece Aj from the point of view of any
player i is bounded by 2K/B ≤ /2, so Vi(A˜j) ∈ [wi,j − , wi,j + ] as required.
As a corollary, we get bounds for computing approximately fair allocations in the RW model.
Corollary 1 (restated) For each  > 0 and number of players n with arbitrary value densities, a
partition that is
• -envy-free and connected can be computed with O(n/) queries
• -equitable, proportional, and connected can be computed with O(n/) queries
• an (, k)-measure splitting with k pieces can be computed with O(k · n2/) queries.
• -perfect can be computed with O(n3/) queries.
B Envy-Free Allocations
In this section we include the proofs for computing lower and upper bounds for the computation
of envy-free allocations.
B.1 Upper Bound
To obtain a logarithmic upper bound for computing connected -envy-free allocations, we will
simulate from the point of view of each player a moving knife procedure due to [BB04].
Barbanel-Brams procedure : Ask each player i to return the point such that one third
of the cake is to the right of it. If an envy-free allocation can be formed with the pieces
demarcated by the player who had the rightmost mark (say 1)—{[0, `], [`, r], [r, 1]}—
output it. Otherwise there are two cases:
Case 1: Both players 2 and 3 strictly prefer the piece [`, r]. Then move a sword
continuously from r towards `, keeping for each position z of the sword, the point t for
8The queries are: Cuti(), Cuti(2), . . . , Cuti((B − 1)).
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which V1(0, t) = V1(z, 1). By the intermediate value theorem, there exists position of the
sword such that one of 2, 3 is indifferent between two pieces, and an envy-free allocation
exists at cuts t,z.
Case 2: Both players 2 and 3 strictly prefer the piece [0, `]. Then move a sword
continuously from ` towards 0, keeping for each position z of the sword the point t such
that V1(z, t) = V1(t, 1). By the intermediate value theorem, there exists position of the
sword such that one of the players 2 and 3 is indifferent between the piece [0, z] and one
of {[z, t], [t, 1]}, which yields an envy-free allocation with cuts t, z.
Theorem 4.1 (restated) A connected -envy-free allocation for three players can be computed with
O
(
log 1
)
queries.
Proof. We will compute an -envy-free allocation using several steps, not all of which are not
included in the Barbanel-Brams protocol. The first step of the Barbanel-Brams protocol is discrete,
and so it can be executed with O(1) RW queries.
If the instance falls in Case 1, we will maintaining the next property:
(a) there exist points 0 < w < z < 1, such that there for some points a < b, a, b ∈ [0, w) we have
V1(0, a) = V1(z, 1), V1(0, b) = V1(w, 1), and players 2 and 3 agree that (i) the piece [a, z] is
larger than any of [0, a] and [z, 1] by more than , while (ii) the piece [b, w] is smaller than
one of [0, b] and [w, 1] by more than .
Consider the following procedure:
1. Initialize w and z by setting z = r and asking player 1 a Cut query to identify its midpoint
w of the cake. Clearly the allocation made with cut points (`, r) has the property that both
players 2 and 3 prefer the middle piece, [`, r], while if the cuts overlap on w, then both 2 and
3 prefer one of the pieces [0, w] or [w, 1].
Figure 3: Case 1 of the simulation.
2. Given points w, z that satisfy invariant (a), for which V1(w, z) ≥ , ask player 1 iteratively a
Cut query to determine the midpoint m ∈ [w, z], for which V1(w,m) = V1(m, z). Then ask
player 1 a Cut query as to return the point m′ for which V1(0,m′) = V1(m, 1). If there is
an -envy-free allocation with cuts m′ and m, output it. Otherwise, if both players 2 and 3
evaluate the piece [m′,m] as the largest among {[0,m′], [m′,m], [m, 1]}, then set z = m. Else,
it must be the case that both 2 and 3 estimate the piece [m′,m] as strictly smaller than at
least one of [0,m′] and [m, 1] by more than ; set w = m. Note the new points w, z still satisfy
property (a).
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Step 1 requires a constant number of queries, while Step 2 is executed at most log 1 times, since the
valuation of player 1 for the interval [w, z] halves with each round; each round of Step 2 requires
a constant number of queries. If an -envy-free allocation has been found after completing Steps 1
and 2, the case is complete. Otherwise, we will further reduce the interval [w, z] until it becomes
small also from the point of view of player 2. Note that the invariant still holds after completing
the previous steps, so there exist a < b < w such that V1(w, z) = V1(a, b) = δ < . By the
intermediate value theorem, we are guaranteed to have an  envy-free solution with cuts x1 ∈ [a, b]
and x2 ∈ [w, z]. Moreover, since V1([a, z]) ≤ 1/3, any allocation obtained with cuts x1 ∈ [a, b],
x2 ∈ [w, z] such that player 1 receives one of the pieces [0, x1], [x2, 1] is -envy-free for player 1.
Recall the piece [a, z] is strictly larger than  than [0, a] and [z, 1] in the estimation of players
2 and 3. We have three subcases, depending on the piece [b, z].
• Exactly one of players 2 and 3 views [b, z] as the largest piece among [0, b], [b, z], and [z, 1].
Then an -envy-free allocation can be obtained with cuts b and z.
• Both players 2 and 3 view [b, z] as larger than [0, b] and [z, 1]. Then there must exist an
-envy-free solution with cuts b and x2 ∈ [w, z]. Such a solution can be found with binary
search on [w, z], using the valuation of player 2 to half the interval [w, z] in each iteration.
The solution x2 reached this way will have the property that player 2 is indifferent (within )
between [b, x2] and one of the outside pieces [0, b] or [x2, 1].
• Otherwise, both players 2 and 3 view the piece [b, z] as smaller than one of [0, b] and [z, 1].
Then by the intermediate value theorem there exists an envy-free allocation with cuts x1 ∈
[a, b] and z. We can find an approximate solution with binary search on the interval [a, b]
using the valuation of player 2 to repeatedly identify the midpoint of [a, b].
Each subcase completes with O
(
log 1
)
queries, which gives a bound of O
(
log 1
)
for Case 1.
Otherwise, we enter Case 2, for which we maintain the invariant:
(b) there exist points 0 < w < z < 1, such that for some points a, b with w < a < b ≤ 1 we have
V1(w, a) = V1(a, 1), V1(z, b) = V1(b, z), and players 2 and 3 agree that (i) the piece [0, z] is
larger than any of [z, b] and [b, 1] by more than , while (ii) the piece [0, w] is smaller than
one of [w, a] and [a, 1] by more than .
The steps for simulating Case 2 are:
3. Initialize w = 0 and z = `. Ask player 1 a Cut query to identify the midpoint q of the cake
in its estimation. An allocation made with cuts ` and r has the property that both players
2 and 3 view the leftmost piece [0, `] as the largest, while the allocation made with pieces
{[0, 0], [0, q], [q, 1]} has the property that none of the players 2 and 3 want the (now empty)
leftmost piece.
4. Given points w, z that satisfy invariant a, for which V1(w, z) ≥ , iteratively ask player 1
a Cut query to determine point m ∈ [w, z] for which V1(w,m) = V1(m, z). Then find, via
another Cut query, the point m′ ∈ [z, 1] for which V1(z,m′) = V1(m′, 1). If an -envy-free
allocation exists with cuts m and m′, output it. Otherwise, if both players 2 and 3 strictly
prefer piece [0,m] to any of [m,m′] and [m′, 1], then update z = m. Else, both 2 and 3 view
[0,m] as strictly smaller than at least one of [m,m′] and [m′, 1] by more than ; set w = m.
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Figure 4: Case 2 of the simulation.
Step 3 requires a constant number of queries, while Step 4 at most log 1 queries. If an -envy-free
allocation has not been found after completing steps 3-4, then since the interval [w, z] is worth less
than  to player 1, we can again reduce the problem to finding an agreement among players 2 and
3, as was done in Case 1. This completes the proof.
B.2 Lower Bound
In this section we develop the lemmas for the lower bound.
Theorem 4.2 (restated). Computing a connected -envy-free allocation for three players requires
Ω
(
log 1
)
queries.
Recall the class of valuations that will be used for the lower bound is that of generalized rigid
measure systems.
Definition 2 (restated). A tuple of value densities (v1, . . . , vn) is a generalized rigid measure
system if:
• the density of each measure is bounded by: 1√
2
< vi(x) <
√
2, for all i = 1 . . . n and x ∈ [0, 1].
• there exist points 0 = x0 < x1 < . . . < xn−1 < xn = 1 and values si, ti for each player i
such that 0 < si < 1/n < ti < 1/2 and the valuations of the players satisfy the constraints:
Vj(xj−1, xj) = Vj(xj , xj+1) = tj for all j = 1 . . . n− 1 and Vn(xn−1, xn) = Vn(0, x1) = tn.
An example for three players is given next.
[0, x] [x, y] [y, 1]
V1 t1 t1 s1
V2 s2 t2 t2
V3 t3 s3 t3
Generalized rigid measure systems satisfy the property that the valuations of the players for
any given piece cannot differ too much.
Lemma 2 (restated) Consider any cake cutting problem where for two players i and j where there
exist a, b > 0 such that for all x ∈ [0, 1], 1/a < vi(x) < b and 1/a < vj(x) < b. Then for any two
pieces S1, S2 of the cake, if Vi(S1) ≥ ab · Vi(S2), it follows that ab · Vj(S1) > Vj(S2).
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Proof. Let S1 and S2 be two pieces of lengths `1 and `2, respectively, such that Vi(S1) ≥ ab ·Vi(S2).
By using the constraints on the densities, we get: ab · Vj(S1) > ab ·
(
`1
a
)
= b · `1 > Vi(S1) ≥
ab · Vi(S2) > ab ·
(
`2
a
)
= b · `2 > Vj(S2) as needed.
A useful notion to measure how close a protocol is to discovering an approximately envy-free
solution on a given instance will be that of a partial rigid measure system, which we define for three
players; the n > 3 definition works similarly.
Definition 3 (restated) A tuple of value densities (v1, v2, v3) is a partial rigid measure system if
• the density of each player i is bounded everywhere: 1√
2
< vi(x) <
√
2, for all x ∈ [0, 1].
• there exist values k > 0 and 1/2 > `i > 1/3 > mi > 0 for each player i, and points
x, x′, y, y′ ∈ [0, 1], so that the matrix of valuations for pieces demarcated by these points is:
[0, x] [x, x′] [x′, y] [y, y′] [y′, 1]
V1 `1 k `1 k m1
V2 m2 k `2 k `2
V3 `3 k m3 k `3
Partial rigid measure systems have the property that if there is a collection of cut points
P = {z1, . . . , zk} ⊂ [0, 1], such that there are no points from P in the intervals (x, x′) and (y, y′),
then any connected partition attainable using cut points from P has envy at least 0.01k.
Lemma 3 (restated) Let (v1, v2, v3) be a partial rigid measure system with parameters k,mi, `i so
that for each i, Vi([x, x
′]) = Vi([y, y′]) = k for some x, x′, y, y′. If P = {z1, . . . , zt} ⊂ [0, 1] is a
collection of cut points such that x, x′, y, y′ ∈ P and there are no points from P in the intervals
(x, x′) and (y, y′), then any connected partition demarcated by points in P has envy at least 0.01k.
Proof. Suppose towards a contradiction there exists an allocation with cut points xˆ, yˆ ∈ P so that
each player is not envious by more than 0.01k. Recall that xˆ, yˆ 6∈ (x, x′) ∪ (y, y′). We show that
every assignment leads to high envy or to a contradiction. There are a few cases:
Case 1 : xˆ ≤ x. Regardless of who owns the piece [0, xˆ], it cannot be the case that yˆ ≤ x, since
that player would envy the right remainder of the cake, namely the interval [yˆ, 1], by an amount
much larger than k. We consider several scenarios, depending on the owner of [0, xˆ].
1.a) Player 1 receives [0, xˆ]. There are two subcases:
• yˆ ∈ [x′, y]. Let S1 = [xˆ, x] and S2 = [yˆ, y]. Since player 1 does not envy any other piece
by more than 0.01k, we have
V1(0, xˆ) ≥ V1(xˆ, yˆ)− 0.01k ⇐⇒ `1 − V1(S1) = V1(0, x)− V1(S1)
≥ V1(x, y) + V1(S1)− V1(S2)− 0.01k = `1 + k + V1(S1)− V1(S2)− 0.01k
⇐⇒ V1(S2) ≥ 2 (V1(S1) + 0.495k)
By Lemma 2, we have that 2Vj(S2) > Vj(S1) + 0.495k for all j ∈ {2, 3}. Then both
players 2 and 3 will prefer the rightmost piece, [yˆ, 1], by a margin of at least 0.01k. For
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player 2, we have
V2(yˆ, 1)− V2(xˆ, yˆ) = V2(yˆ, y) + k + V2(y′, 1)− (V2(x, y) + V2(S1)− V2(S2))
= k + V2(S2) + `2 − (`2 + k + V2(S1)− V2(S2)) = 2V2(S2)− V2(S1)
> 0.495k > 0.01k
For player 3, we have
V3(yˆ, 1)− V3(xˆ, yˆ) = V3(yˆ, y) + k + V3(y′, 1)− (V3(x, y) + V3(S1)− V3(S2))
= 2V3(S2)− V3(S1) + (`3 −m3) > 0.495k + `3 −m3 > 0.01k
• yˆ ≥ y′. Then player 1 will envy the middle piece by at least 2k:
V1(xˆ, yˆ)− V1(0, xˆ) = V1(xˆ, x) + k + `1 + k + V1(y′, yˆ)− V1(0, xˆ) ≥ `1 + 2k − `1 = 2k
1.b) Player 2 receives [0, xˆ]. Then by approximate envy-freeness, we have
V2(0, xˆ) ≥ V2(xˆ, yˆ)− 0.01k and V2(0, xˆ) ≥ V2(yˆ, 1)− 0.01k
By summing up the two inequalities, we get
V2(0, xˆ) ≥ V2(xˆ, 1)/2− 0.01k = (1− V2(0, xˆ))/2− 0.01k ⇐⇒ 3V2(0, xˆ)/2 ≥ 1/2− 0.01k
⇐⇒ V2(0, xˆ) ≥ 1/3− 0.02k/3
Since m2 ≥ V2(0, xˆ), 2`2 +m2 + 2k = 1, and `2 > 1/3, we get m2 = 1− 2`2 − 2k < 1/3− 2k,
so 1/3− 2k > m2 ≥ V2(0, xˆ) ≥ 1/3− 0.02k/3. Contradiction, so the case cannot happen.
1.c) Player 3 receives [0, xˆ]. We have the following subcases:
• yˆ ∈ [x′, y]. Then V3(0, xˆ) ≤ `3, while V3(yˆ, 1) ≥ `3 + k, thus player 3 envies the piece
[yˆ, 1] by more than 0.01k.
• yˆ ≥ y′. Then both players 1 and 2 value the middle piece [xˆ, yˆ] more than the rightmost
piece [yˆ, 1], and the difference is larger than 0.01k. For player 2 we have V2(xˆ, yˆ) ≥ `2+2k,
while V2(yˆ, 1) ≤ `2, and for player 1 we have V1(xˆ, yˆ) ≥ `1+2k, while V1(yˆ, 1) ≤ m1 < `1.
Thus no player can accept the leftmost piece, [0, xˆ], which completes Case 1.
Case 2 : xˆ ∈ [x′, y]. Then yˆ ≥ y′, since no player would accept (even within envy 0.01k) a piece
smaller than [x′, y]. Moreover, players 1 and 3 would not accept the piece [yˆ, 1] since they would
envy the player owning [0, xˆ] by more than k. Thus the piece [yˆ, 1] can only be assigned to player
2. Let S1 = [x
′, xˆ] and S2 = [y′, yˆ]. By approximate envy-freeness of player 2, we have
V2(yˆ, 1) ≥ V2(xˆ, yˆ)− 0.01k = V2(x′, y)− V2(S1) + V2(S2) + k − 0.01k = `2 − V2(S1) + V2(S2) + 0.99k
Since V2(yˆ, 1) = `2 − V2(S2), we get that
`2 − V2(S2) ≥ `2 − V2(S1) + V2(S2) + 0.99k ⇐⇒ V2(S1) ≥ 2 (V2(S2) + 0.495k)
By Lemma 2, we have 2Vj(S1) ≥ Vj(S2) + 0.99k for all j ∈ {1, 3}.
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We wish to show that both players 1 and 3 would only accept the leftmost piece [0, xˆ] from the
remaining pieces. For player 1, we have
V1(0, xˆ)− V1(xˆ, yˆ) = V1(0, x) + V1(x, x′) + V1(S1)− (V1(x′, y)− V1(S1) + k + V1(S2))
= `1 + k + V1(S1)− `1 + V1(S1)− k − V1(S2) = 2V1(S1)− V1(S2)
≥ 0.495k > 0.01k
For player 3, using the fact that `3 > m3, we have
V3(0, xˆ)− V3(xˆ, yˆ) = V3(0, x) + V3(x, x′) + V3(S1)− (V3(x′, y)− V3(S1) + k + V3(S2))
= `3 + k + V3(S1)−m3 + V3(S1)− k − V3(S2) = 2V3(S1)− V3(S2) + `3 −m3
≥ 0.495k + `3 −m3 > 0.01k
Case 3 : xˆ ≥ y′. This scenario is clearly infeasible, since all the players would envy the owner of
the piece [0, xˆ] by at least 2k.
In all the cases we obtained a contradiction, so any partition attained with cut points from P
has envy at least 0.01k. This completes the proof.
Next we show how queries can be answered one at a time so that the valuations remain consis-
tent with (some) partial rigid measure system throughout the execution of a protocol.
Lemma 4 (restated) Suppose that at some point during the execution of an RW protocol for three
players the valuations and cuts discovered are consistent with a partial rigid measure system with
parameters k > 0, 0 < mi < 1/3 < `i < 1/2 for each i, and points x, y, so that the valuations are:
If the intervals I = [x, x+ k] and J = [y, y+ k] have no cut points inside, then a new cut query
can be answered so that the valuations remain consistent with a partial rigid measure system where
two new intervals I ′ ⊆ I and J ′ ⊆ J have no cuts inside, length 0.01k, and the densities of all the
players are uniform on I ′, J ′.
We will show how to set the values when the query is addressed to player 1. The other cases,
when players 2 and 3 have to answer, are similar, but included for completeness.
Part a of Lemma 4
Proof. We show how to set the values when the query is addressed to player 1: Cut1(α). If the
answer to the cut query falls outside I and J , we can answer in a way that is arbitrary but con-
sistent with the history. The more difficult scenario is when the answer must be a point inside I
or J , for which we must hide the solution inside smaller, but not too small, new intervals I ′ ⊆ I
and J ′ ⊆ J . Let P be the collection of cut points that have been discovered by A before the query
is received. By symmetry, it will be sufficient to solve the problem where the new cut query falls
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in interval I; thus α ∈ (`1, `1 + k). If the cut query falls on the left side of interval I, we hide the
solution in a subinterval I ′ (of length 100 times smaller than I) on the right side of I, and viceversa.
Case 1 : α ∈ (`1, `1 + 2k/3]. We will hide the new interval I ′ on the right side of the point
x+ 2k/3. Let m = x+ 2k/3, n = x+ 2k/3 + 0.01k, and I ′ = [m,n]. Similarly let p = y + 1.03k/3,
q = y+1.03k/3+0.01k, and J ′ = [p, q]. Update the collection of cut points to P ′ = P∪{m,n, p, q}.
Let the value of each player i for the intervals I ′ and J ′ be exactly 0.01k. Since I ′ and J ′ have length
0.01k, the densities remain uniform in these intervals. Set the values of player 1 for the other new
intervals to V1(x,m) = 2k/3, V1(n, x+k) = 0.97k/3, V1(y, p) = 1.03k/3, and V1(q, y+k) = 1.94k/3.
Denote the values of player 2 for the unknown intervals by V2(x,m) = 0.99k−λk, V2(n, x+k) =
λk, V2(y, p) = µk, V2(q, y+ k) = 0.99k− µk, where 0 < λ, µ < 0.99. Note the values add up to the
weight of I and J for player 2:
• V2(x, x+ k) = V2(x,m) + V2(m,n) + V2(n, x+ k) = 0.99k − λk + 0.01k + λk = k
• V2(y, y + k) = V2(y, p) + V2(p, q) + V2(q, y + k) = µk + 0.01k + 0.99k − µk = k
For player 3, the values of the unknown intervals are V3(x,m) = 0.99k − φk, V3(n, x + k) =
φk, V3(y, p) = ψk, and V3(q, y + k) = 0.99k − ψk, where 0 < φ,ψ < 0.99k. The weights add up to
the value of player 3 for the intervals I and J through a check similar to the one for player 2.
We obtain the configuration in Figure 5, where the parameters λ, µ, φ, ψ must be determined.
Figure 5: Partial rigid measure system for α ∈ (`1, `1 + 2k/3]. The break points are m = x+ 2k/3,
n = x + 2k/3 + 0.01k, p = y + 1.03k/3, q = y + 1.03k/3 + 0.01k. The densities are uniform on
[m,n], [p, q].
The remaining requirements for the new configuration to form a partial rigid measure system
are that the values yield a new configuration with parameters `′i,m
′
i and all the densities on [x,m],
[n, x+ k], [y, p], and [q, y + k] are in the required bounds of 1/
√
2 and
√
2.
For player 1, by choice of values we have that `′1 = `1 + 2k/3 = 0.97k/3 + `1 + 1.03k/3 and
m′1 = m1 + 1.94k/3. Moreover, it can be verified that player 1’s density will be uniform on all
of the new intervals, which clearly belongs to the range
(
1/
√
2,
√
2
)
. For player 2 we must find
0 < λ, µ < 0.99 such that the values still form a partial rigid measure system. Thus λk+ `2 +µk =
0.99k − µk + `2 ⇐⇒ λ + 2µ = 0.99 ⇐⇒ µ = 0.495 − λ/2. By choice of the points m,n, p, q
and the valuations, the density of player 2 on the different intervals is: (297− 300λ)/200 on [x,m],
300λ/97 on [n, x+ k], 297/206− 150λ/103 on [y, p], and 297/388 + 150λ/194 on [q, y + k].
Set λ = 0.25. Then the density is in (1/
√
2,
√
2) and there exists a solution for player 2. Let
µ = 0.37, m′2 = m2 + 0.99k − 0.25k, and `′2 = λk + `2 + µk = 99k/100− µk + `2.
Finally, for player 3, we must find 0 < φ,ψ < 0.99 so that `3+0.99k−φk = 0.99k−ψk+`3 ⇐⇒
φ = ψ. The density of player 3 is: 1.485− 1.5φ on [x,m], 300φ/97 on [n, x+ k], 300φ/103 on [y, p],
and 297/194 − 300φ/194 on [q, y + k]. By setting φ = ψ = 0.25, we obtain correct range for the
density of player 3. Let `′3 = `3 + 0.99k − 0.25k and m′3 = m3 + 0.5k.
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Now we can answer the query. Since `1 < α < `1+2k/3, and the values of all the players on the
interval [x,m] have been set, find the point z with the property that V1(x, z) = α and the density
is uniform for player 1 on [x, z]. Then fit the answers for the other two players, proportional with
their average density on [x, z], and update P ′ to include the point z.
Case 2 : α ∈ (`1 + 2k/3, `1 + k). This time the interval I ′ will be hidden on the left side of x+2k/3.
Define m = x+2k/3−0.01k and n = x+2k/3. Set I ′ = [m,n]. Let p = y+0.97k/3 and q = y+k/3.
Set J ′ = [p, q]. Update the collection of cut points to P ′ = P ∪ {m,n, p, q}. Let the value of each
player i for the intervals I ′ and J ′ be exactly 0.01k; again the densities remain uniform on I ′ and
J ′. Set the values of player 1 for the other intervals to V1(x,m) = 2k/3 − 0.01k, V1(n, x + k) =
k/3, V1(y, p) = 0.97k/3, and V1(q, y+k) = 2k/3. It can be verified that player 1’s density is uniform
on all the new intervals. Update `′1 = `1 + 2k/3− 0.01k and m′1 = m1 + 2k/3.
For players 2 and 3 we must find parameters 0 < λ, µ, φ, ψ < 0.99 such that the matrix of
valuations in Figure 6 is consistent with a partial rigid measure system.
Figure 6: Partial rigid measure system for α ∈ (`1 + 2k/3, `1 + k). The break points are m =
x+ 2k/3− 0.01k, n = x+ 2k/3, p = y+ 0.97k/3, q = y+k/3; uniform densities on [m,n] and [p, q].
For player 2 we obtain from Case 1 that µ = 99/200− λ/2. The density of player 2 is: 297/197−
300λ/197 on [x,m], 3λ on [n, x + k], 300µ/97 on [y, p], and 297/200 − 3µ/2 on [q, y + k]. Setting
λ = 0.25 ensures the density on each of these intervals is in (1/
√
2,
√
2). Then µ = 0.37. Update
`′2 = `2 + 0.62k and µ′2 = m2 + 0.74k.
For player 3, by symmetry with Case 1, we have φ = ψ and 0 < φ < 0.99. The density of
player 3 is 297/197− 300φ/197 on [x,m],3φ on [n, x+ k], 300φ/103 on [y, p], and 297/200− 3φ/2
on [q, y + k]. Setting φ = ψ = 0.25 ensures the density on each interval is in the (1
√
2,
√
2) range.
Update `′3 = `3 + 0.74k and m′3 = m3 + 0.5k.
We can now answer the query addressed to player 1. The interval [0,m] has the property that
V1(0,m) = `1 + 2k/3, and so α > V1(0,m). Thus we can return a point z ∈ (n, x + k) with the
property that player 1’s density is uniform on [n, z]. Add z to P ′ and report the answers of the
other players for the piece [n, z] in a way that is proportional to their average density on [n, x+ k].
Thus if player 1 receives a query falling inside interval I, we can find answers so that the new
configuration is still a partial rigid measure system with the properties required by the lemma.
Part b of Lemma 4
Proof. Here the query is for player 2, say Cut2(α). We have two cases:
Case 1 : α ∈ (m2,m2 + 2k/3]. We will hide the interval at the right of the point x+ 2k/3. Define
m = x+ 2k/3 and n = x+ 2k/3 + 0.01k. Set I ′ = [m,n]. Let p = y + k/3 and q = y + k/3 + 0.01k
Set J ′ = [p, q]. Let the values of all the players be 0.01k in the intervals I ′ and J ′. Since the length
of these intervals is exactly 0.01k, it follows that everyone’s densities are uniform herein.
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Set the density of player 2 uniform on each of the generated subintervals. Then 0.97k/3 + `2 +
k/3 = 1.97k/3 + `2. Thus for player 2 the values are consistent with a partial rigid measure system.
Set `′2 = `2 + 1.97k/3 and m′2 = m2 + 2k/3.
We must now fit the valuations of players 1 and 3, which implies again finding parameters
0 < λ, µ, φ, ψ < 0.99 so that the matrix of valuations is:
For the valuation of player 1 to be consistent with a partial rigid measure system, `1 + 0.99k−
λk = λk + `1 + µk ⇐⇒ µ = 0.99 − 2λ. The density of player 1 must lie in
(
1/
√
2,
√
2
)
and is
given by: 297/200− 3λ/2 on the interval [x,m], 300λ/97 on [n, x+ k], 297/100− 6λ on [y, p], and
600λ/197 on [q, y + k]. Set λ = 0.26 and µ = 0.47. Update `′1 = `1 + 0.73k and m′1 = m1 + 0.52k.
Finally let φ = ψ. Player 3’s density is: 297/200− 3φ/2 on [x,m], 300φ/97 on [n, x+ k], 3φ on
[y, p], and (0.99k − φk)/(1.97k/3) on [q, y + k]. For φ = ψ = 0.25, the density is in (1/√2,√2).
Then `′3 = `3 + 0.75k and m′3 = m3 + 0.5k.
Case 2 : α ∈ (m2 + 2k/3,m2 + k). This time we will hide the interval to the left of the point
x + 2k/3. Define m = x + 2k/3− 0.01k, n = x + 2k/3,p = y + 1.97k/6, and q = y + 2.03k/6. Set
I ′ = [m,n] and J ′ = [p, q] and let the densities of all the players be uniform on I ′ and J ′. It can
be verified that k/3 + `2 + 1.97k/6 = 3.97k/6 + `2; moreover its density is uniform on all the new
intervals. Update m′2 = m2 + 2k/3− 0.01k and `′2 = `2 + 3.97k/6.
The goal is to fit the valuations of players 1 and 3, which implies computing values 0 <
λ, µ, φ, ψ < 0.99 so that the matrix of valuations is:
For player 1, we have µ = 0.99 − 2λ and density: (0.99 − λ)/(197/300) on the interval
[x,m], λk/(k/3) = 3λ on [n, x + k], µk/(1.97k/6) = 600/197 · (0.99− 2λ) on [y, p], and (0.99k −
µk)/(3.97k/6) = 1200λ/297 on [q, y+k]. Setting λ = 0.265 and µ = 0.46 gives the required density
bounds. Update `′1 = `1 + 0.725k and m′1 = m1 + 0.53k.
For player 3 we have φ = ψ and the densities: (0.99 − φ)/(1.97/3) on [x,m], φk/(k/3) = 3φ
on [n, x + k], φk/(1.97k/6) = 600φ/197 on [y, p], and (0.99 − φ)/(397/600) on [q, y + k]. For
φ = ψ = 0.25, the density is in the required range. Set `′3 = `3 + 0.74k and m′3 = m3 + 0.5k.
Similarly to part I of the proof, the query asked by the protocol falls outside the new intervals
I ′ and J ′, and so it can be answered uniformly for player 2 and proportionally to the weight on the
respective interval for players 1 and 3. This completes the second part of the proof.
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Part c of Lemma 4
Proof. We analyze the situation where the protocol A addresses a query to player 3. Let the query
be Cut3(α) and consider two cases:
Case 1 : α ∈ (`3, `3 + 2k/3]. We will hide the interval at the right of the point x + 2k/3. Define
m = x+ 2k/3,n = x+ 2k/3 + 0.01k, p = y + k/3− 0.01k, and q = y + k/3.
Set I ′ = [m,n] and J ′ = [p, q]. Let the value of each player be 0.01k for the intervals I ′ and
J ′. Again all densities are uniform on I ′ and J ′. Set the density of player 3 uniform on all the
new intervals and update `′3 = `3 + 2k/3 and m′3 = m3 + 1.94k/3. The goal is to find appropriate
valuations for players 1 and 2, that is, appropriate values of the parameters 0 < λ, µ, φ, ψ < 0.99
consistent with the next matrix.
Note that `1 + 0.99k − λk = λk + `1 + µk if and only if µ = 0.99 − 2λ. Player 1’s density is
297/200− 3λ/2 on [x,m], 300λ/97 on [n, x+ k], 300/97 · (0.99− 2λ) on [y, p], and 3λ on [q, y + k].
Setting λ = 0.267 ensures the required density bound. Then µ = 0.456. Update `′1 = `1 + 0.723k
and m′1 = m1 + 0.534k.
For player 2, φk + `2 + ψk = 0.99k − ψk + `2 if and only if ψ = 99/200 − φ/2. Player 2’s
density is 297/200 − 3φ/2 on [x,m], 300φ/97 on [n, x + k], 300/97 · (99/200− φ/2) on [y, p], and
297/400 + 3φ/4 on [q, y + k]. Setting φ = 0.25 works. Then ψ = 0.37. Update `′2 = `2 + 0.62k and
m′2 = m2 + 0.74k.
Case 2 : α ∈ (`3 + 2k/3, `3 + k). We will hide the interval at the left of the point x+ 2k/3. Define
m = x + 2k/3 − 0.01k, n = x + 2k/3, p = y + k/3, and q = y + k/3 + 0.01k. Set I ′ = [m,n],
J ′ = [p, q].
Let the values of all the players be 0.01k for the entire intervals I ′ and J ′. Again all densities
are uniform on I ′ and J ′. Set the density of player 3 uniform on all the new intervals and update
`′3 = `3 + 2k/3− 0.01k and m′3 = m3 + 2k/6. The goal is to find the appropriate values for players
1 and 2, or equivalently, 0 < λ, µ, φ, ψ < 0.99 as in the next matrix.
For player 1 we get µ = 0.99 − 2λ and density (297 − 300λ)/197 on [x,m], 3λ on [n, x + k],
297/100 − 6λ on [y, p], and 600λ/197 on [q, y + k]. Setting λ = 0.26 ensures 2’s density is in the
required range. Then µ = 0.47. Update `′1 = `1 + 0.73k and m′1 = m1 + 0.52k.
Finally, we must fit the answers of player 2. We get ψ = 99/200 − φ/2 and density (297 −
300φ)/197 on [x,m], 3φ on [n, x + k], 297/200 − 3φ/2 on [y, p], and (99/200 + φ/2)/(197/300) on
[q, y + k]. Let φ = 0.25. Then ψ = 0.37. Update `′2 = `2 + 0.62k and m′2 = m2 + 0.74k.
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In both cases the query to player 3 falls outside the interval I ′, so the query can be answered
for all the players in a way that is proportional to their density on the respective interval.
We can now prove the lower bound.
Proof. (of Theorem 4.2) Set the initial configuration to a partial rigid measure system as in the
next table, where k = 0.01 and `i = 0.35, mi = 0.28 for each player i. The initial cuts are at
0.34, 0.35, 0.67, 0.68, with I = [0.34, 0.35] and J = [0.67, 0.68]. It can be verified that these have
the required densities.
[0, 0.34] [0.34, 0.35] [0.35, 0.67] [0.67, 0.68] [0.68, 1]
V1 0.35 0.01 0.35 0.01 0.28
V2 0.28 0.01 0.35 0.01 0.35
V3 0.35 0.01 0.28 0.01 0.35
Table 2: Initial configuration for envy-free lower bound.
By iteratively applying Lemma 4 with every Cut query, a protocol discovers with every cut
query a partial rigid system, where the intervals I and J always have uniform density, and their
length cannot be diminished by a factor larger than 100 in each iteration. By Lemma 2, if a
protocol encounters a partial rigid measure system for which there are no cuts inside I and J ,
where |I| = |J | = k, then any configuration attainable with the existing cuts leads to envy of at
least 0.01k. To get -envy, we need k/100 < , and so the number of queries is Ω
(
log 1
)
.
Theorem 4.3 (restated) Computing a connected -envy-free allocation for n ≥ 3 players requires
Ω
(
log 1
)
queries.
Proof. For ease of exposition, we assume the number of players is divisible by 3. Let K = n/3
and divide the players in disjoint sets of three, such that each group Si = {3i − 2, 3i − 1, 3i},
for i ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, the players in Si are only interested in the piece Ji = [(i − 1)/K, i/K], and
their valuations form a generalized rigid measure system on Ji with higher densities, such that
K/
√
2 < vj(x) < K
√
2, for each player j ∈ Si and x ∈ Ji. By applying Lemma 2 for a =
√
2/K
and b = K
√
2, we get that for any two disjoint pieces S1, S2 ⊂ Ji, if the valuation of player i
satisfies Vi(S1) ≥ 2Vi(S2), then the valuation of another player j in the same group as i satisfies
2Vj(S1) ≥ Vj(S2). Thus Lemma 3 still applies for each group Si and interval Ji. The queries
are handled as follows. Whenever a player j ∈ Si receives a cut query outside the piece they are
interested in, the answer is given so as to not introduce new cut points. On the other hand, if player
j receives a cut query in the interval Si, the answer is given as in the construction of Theorem 4.2,
where the points are scaled to reside in Ji.
Consider the final allocation computed by an RW protocol A, and let xi be the cut point that
separates group Si from group Si+1. If x1 ≥ 1/K, then the allocation A is -envy-free among
the players in S1 if and only if the algorithm discovers the generalized rigid measure system on
[0, 1/K], since the piece [1/K, x1] is worth zero to all the players in S1. Otherwise, x1 ≤ 1/K. If
x2 ≥ 2/K, then for the allocation to be -envy-free among the players in S2, Amust discover (within
 error) the measure system among the players in S2 on interval J2. Otherwise, we have x2 ≤ 2/K.
Iteratively, we either find an interval i ≤ K − 1 where the algorithm must solve the problem where
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the solution is unique among the group Si, or reach i = K with xK−1 ≤ (K−1)/K, case in which A
must find the measure system among the players SK on JK . Since finding an -envy-free allocation
on Ji among Si requires Ω
(
log 1
)
queries for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, which implies the required lower
bound. The cases where the number of players is of the form n = 3K + 1 and n = 3K + 2 can be
solved by extending the lemmas for three players to four and five players, respectively, by observing
that the cases that appear in both Lemma 3 and Lemma 4 rely on a number of combinations that
are independent of the number of players (in the case of Lemma 3, whether a player gets allocated
a piece with two columns, one, or none, while in the case of Lemma 4, whether the cut falls in an
interval worth mi or `i to a player, and whether the new interval maintained is hidden on the left or
right side of the cut). Then when n = 3K + 1, the group S1 = {1, 2, 3, 4}, while when n = 3K + 2,
S1 = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}.
The lower bound of Ω
(
log 1
)
is in fact tight for the class of generalized rigid measure systems,
for any (fixed) number of players.
Theorem 4.4 (restated). For the class of generalized rigid measure systems, a connected -envy-
free allocation can be computed with O
(
log 1
)
queries for any fixed number n of players.
Proof. The following moving knife protocol computes an exact envy-free allocation for any number
of players with valuations given by a generalized rigid measure system.
• Let xα = Cut1(1/n) and xω = Cut1(1/2).
• Player 1 continuously moves a knife from xα to xω. For each position x1 of the first knife:
• Player 1 positions a second knife at x2 = Cut1(2 · t1), where t1 = V1(0, x1). Define
s1 = 1− 2 · t1.
• For each k = 3 . . . n−1, player 1 positions its k-th knife at xk = Cut1(2 · t1 + (k−2) · s1)
if possible, and at xk = 1 otherwise.
• If a connected envy-free allocation can be obtained with cuts x1, . . . , xn−1, player 1 shouts stop
and the cake is divided according to the envy-free allocation.
Since player 1 goes over all possible choices of t1, if the input is a generalized RMS, there will exist
a choice for which the partition demarcated by player 1 reveals the correct si, ti parameters of all
the players. This moving knife protocol can be simulated approximately in the RW model when n
is fixed by doing binary search on the parameter t1 for player 1 and checking for each choice if the
tentative allocation is -envy-free, so computing envy-free allocations for generalized rigid measure
systems can be solved with O
(
log 1
)
queries.
C Perfect Allocations
In this section we provide the lower and upper bounds for computing perfect allocations for two
players. An upper bound of O(log −1) for this problem can be obtained simulating Austin’s moving
procedure in the RW model.
Theorem 5.1 (restated) An -perfect allocation for two players can be computed with O(log 1 )
queries.
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Proof. The main idea is to simulate Austin’s moving knife procedure in the RW query model,
searching first by the valuation of the first player.
Austin’s procedure: A referee slowly moves a knife from left to right across the cake.
At any point, a player can call stop. When a player called, a second knife is placed at
the left edge of the cake. The player that shouted stop – say 1 – then moves both knives
parallel to each other. While the two knives are moving, player 2 can call stop at any
time. After 2 called stop, a randomly selected player gets the portion between player 1’s
knives, while the other one gets the two outside pieces.
In the RW model, we start by asking both players to reveal the midpoint of the cake. If
the midpoints coincide within , we reached an -perfect allocation. Otherwise, without loss of
generality, assume the rightmost midpoint is reported by player 1 (the case of player 2 is similar);
denote this cut by z. Then V1(0, z) = V1(z, 1) = 1/2, while V2(0, z) > 1/2. Initialize w = 1.
Figure 7: Approximate computation of -perfect partition. Maintain two points z and w, such that
the rightmost cut must be situated in the interval [z, w]
In the RW model we maintain the following invariant:
(a) There exist cut points 0 ≤ z < w ≤ 1, such that the piece [a, z] for which V1(a, z) = 1/2 is
worth strictly more than 1/2 +  to player 2, while the piece [b, w] for which V1(b, w) = 1/2 is
worth strictly less than 1/2−  to player 2.
Iteratively, given points w, z satisfying property (a), such that V1(w, z) ≥ , ask player 1 a Cut
query to determine the midpoint m of [w, z], i.e. such that V1(z,m) = V2(m,w), and then find
through another Cut query the point m′ for which V1(m′,m) = 1/2. If there exists an -perfect
allocation with cuts m and m′ then output it. Otherwise, if V2(m′,m) > 1/2, set z = m. Else, it
must be the case that V2(m
′,m) < 1/2; set w = m.
Each step requires a constant number of queries, and the number of iterations is O
(
log 1
)
.
If the interval [w, z] is worth strictly less than  to player 1, but an -perfect allocation has
not been found, let a be such that V1(a,w) = 1/2. Any partition with cuts a and x ∈ [w, z] is
-perfect for player 1. Then we can search for x ∈ [w, z] using the valuation of player 2, halving
the interval [w, z] in each round. A solution is guaranteed to exist and the maximum number of
queries addressed to player 2 is O
(
log 1
)
.
As we show next, this bound is optimal.
Theorem 5.2 (restated) Computing an -perfect allocation with the minimum number of cuts for
two players requires Ω
(
log 1
)
queries.
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We prove the lower bound by maintaining throughout the execution of any protocol two intervals
in which the cuts of the perfect allocation must be situated, such that the distance to a perfect
partition cannot decrease too much with any cut query.
Lemma 5 (restated) Let  > 0. Consider a two player instance consistent with Figure 8, where
1.  < 0.001 min{a, d}.
2. any allocation obtained with cuts 0 < k < ` < 1 that is -perfect from the point of view of
player 1 is worth to player 2 less than 0.5−d/100− when k < x and more than 0.5+d/100+
when k > x+ a.
3. there are no cut points inside the intervals I = [x, x+ a] and J = [y, y + a].
Figure 8: Construction for perfect. Player 1 has uniform density everywhere; y = x + 0.5, 0 <
a, d ≤ 0.1, x, b, c, e > 0, x+ a+ b = 0.5 and c+ 2d+ e = 0.5.
Then a new query can be handled so that the valuations remain consistent with Figure 8, such
that condition 2 holds with respect to new intervals I ′ = [x′, x′ + a′] ⊆ I, J ′ = [y′, y′ + a′] ⊆ J and
parameters x′, a′ = a/100, d′ = d/100, and the intervals I ′ and J ′ have no cuts inside.
Proof. The valuations can be assumed to be made public outside I, J , so queries that fall outside
these intervals are handled by the conditions in the lemma. Otherwise, suppose player 2 receives a
query Cut2(α) in one of the intervals I, J . The scenario where player 1 receives the query will follow
from the analysis for player 2. The new intervals maintained will be I ′ = [m,n], J ′ = [p, q], where
m,n, p, q are defined depending on the query. Set a′ = a/100, d′ = d/8, and let 0 < k < ` < 1
be the defining cuts of a partition that is -perfect from the point of view of player 1. Then
0.5−  ≤ `− k ≤ 0.5 + . We show that if k, ` 6∈ I ′, J ′, then [k, `] is either too small or too large for
player 2. Consider the first scenario, where player 2’s answer is in the interval I.
Case 1.a. α ∈ (c, c + d/2]. Let m = x + a/2, n = x + 51a/100, p = y + a/2, q = y + 51a/100, so
the valuations are consistent with the next matrix.
Next we show that if k ≤ m, then the piece [k, `] is worth less than 0.5− d′/100−  to player 2,
while if k > n, then [k, `] is worth more than 0.5 + d′/100 +  to player 2. If k < x− , then ` ≤ y,
and the claim holds by the assumption in the lemma’s statement. If k > x+ a+ , then ` ≥ y + a,
and the lemma holds. Otherwise, we have a few cases:
• k ∈ [x − , x]. Then ` ≤ y + . Let w = V2(x − , x). Since V2(x − , y) = w + V2(x, y) =
w + 0.5− d < 0.5− d/100− , we have w < 99d/100− . Since  < a, we get
V2(k, `) ≤ w+V2(x, y) +V2(y, y+ ) ≤ (99d/100− ) + (0.5− d) +  · 11d/8
a/2
< 0.5− d′/100− 
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• k ∈ [x,m]. Let δ = k − x ≤ a/2. Then ` ≤ min{p, y + δ + }. When  < min{a, d}, we have
V2(k, `) ≤ (a/2−δ)· d
a
+0.5−3d/2+(δ+)· 11d/8
a/2
= 0.5−d+δ · 7d
4a
≤ 0.5−d/8 < 0.5−d′/100−
• k ∈ [n, x+ a]. Let δ = k − n. Recall k + 0.5−  ≤ ` ≤ k + 0.5 + . If  > δ, then
V2(k, `) ≥ V2(k, x+ a) + V2(x+ a, q) ≥
(
3d/8− δ · 3d/8
49a/100
)
+ (0.5− d/4)
≥ 0.5 + d/8−  · 3d/8
49a/100
> 0.5 + d′/100 + 
Otherwise, δ > . We have
V2(k, `) ≥ V2(k, x+ a) + V2(x+ a, q) + V2(q, q + δ − )
≥
(
3d/8− δ · 3d/8
49a/100
)
+ (0.5− d/4) + (δ − ) · 10d/8
49a/100
> 0.5 + d/8−  · 10d/8
49a/100
> 0.5 + d′/100 + 
• k ∈ [x+a, x+a+]. If ` > y+a, the claim holds. Else, ` ∈ [q, y+a]. Let w = V2(x+a, x+a+).
Then V2(x+ a+ , y + a) = 0.5 + d− w > 0.5 + d/100 + , so w < 99d/100− . We have
V2(k, `) ≥ V2(x+ a+ , y + a− ) ≥ 0.5 + d− w −  · (10d/8)/(49a/100) > 0.5 + d′/100 + 
Case 1.b. α ∈ (c+ d/2, c+ d). Let m = x+ 49a/100, n = x+ a/2, p = y + 49a/100, q = y + a/2.
Let the valuations outside I ′, J ′ be known and consistent with the next matrix.
We show the required discrepancy holds for the piece [k, `]. If k < x −  or k > x + a + , the
claim follows by the lemma’s condition. The remaining cases are:
• k ∈ [x − , x]. We have w = V2(x − , x) < 99d/100 − . Since  < 0.001a, we have
V2(k, `) ≤ w + V2(x, y) +  · (10d/8)/(49a/100) < 0.5− d′/100− .
• k ∈ [x,m]. Let δ = k − x. Note V2(m, y) = 0.5 − 11d/8. Since δ ≤ 49a/100 and  <
0.01 min{a, d}, we get
V2(k, `) ≤ (49a/100− δ) · 3d/8
49a/100
+ 0.5− 11d/8 + (δ + ) · 10d/8
49a/100
< 0.5− d′/100− 
• k ∈ [n, x+ a]. Let δ = k − n. We have ` ≥ k + 0.5−  and  < 0.01 min{a, d}. If δ ≤ , then
V2(k, `) ≥ V2(n, q)−  · d/a = 0.5 + d/8−  · d/a > 0.5 + d′/100 + .
Otherwise, δ > , thus ` ∈ [q, y + a]. Since V2(x+ a, q) = 0.5− 3d/8, we get
V2(k, `) ≥ d/2− δ · d/a+ 0.5− 3d/8 + (δ − ) · (11d/8)/(a/2) > 0.5 + d′/100 + .
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• k ∈ [x + a, x + a + ]. Using that w = V2(x + a, x + a + ) < 99d/100−  and  < 0.01a, we
get V2(k, `) ≥ 0.5 + d− w −  · (11d/8)/(a/2) > 0.5 + d′/100 + .
The second scenario, where the answer of player 2 falls in the interval J , has two subcases:
Case 2.a. α ∈ (0.5 + c − d, 0.5 + c + d/2]. Let m = x + a/2, n = x + 51a/100, p = y + a/2,
q = y + 51a/100. Set the valuations consistent with the next matrix.
If k < x −  or k > x + a + , the discrepancy between the valuations of the players for [k, `]
holds by the lemma’s statement. If k ∈ [x− , x], note the change in the density of player 2 on the
interval [y, p] compared to Case 1.a is constant, thus a similar argument works when  < 0.001a.
If k ∈ [x+ a, x+ a+ ], the claim also follows from Case 1.a, where the interval [q, y + a] had the
same length and higher value density for player 2 than here. The remaining cases are:
• k ∈ [x,m]. Let δ = k − x ≤ a/2. Then V2(k, `) ≤ 0.5 − d + δ · 7d/(4a) ≤ 0.5 − d/8 <
0.5− d′/100− .
• k ∈ [n, x + a]. Let δ = k − n. If δ ≤ , the claim follows as in Case 1.a. If δ > , then
V2(k, `) ≥ 0.5 + d/8−  · (9d/8)/(49a/100) > 0.5 + d′/100 + .
Case 2.b. α ∈ (0.5 + c + d/2, 0.5 + c + 2d). Let m = x + 49a/100, n = x + a/2, p = y + 49a/100,
q = y + a/2, with valuations as in the matrix on the next page. If k ≤ x, k ∈ [x+ a, x+ a+ ], or
k > x+ a+ , the claim follows as in the previous cases. If
• k ∈ [x,m]. Let δ = k− x ≤ 49a/100. Then V2(k, `) ≤ 0.5− d− δ · (d/4)/(49a/100) + (δ + ) ·
(9d/8)/(49a/100) ≤ 0.5− d/8 +  · (9d/8)/(49a/100) ≤ 0.5− d′/100− .
• k ∈ [n, x + a]. Let δ = k − n. If δ ≤  the claim is as in Case 1.b. If δ > , V2(k, `) ≥
0.5 + d/8 + δ · 290d/(8a)−  · 300d/(8a) > 0.5 + d′/100 + .
Thus each cut query can be answered so that the new partition is still d′/100 far from perfect
whenever player 1 believes the middle piece is almost perfect, where the values of a′ and d′ has
been reduced by a constant factor. This completes the proof of the lemma.
We can now prove the lower bound for perfect allocations.
Proof. (of Theorem 5.2) Let the initial configuration be defined as follows, with initial parameters
a = d = 0.1, x = 0.2, y = 0.7, b = 0.2, c = e = 0.15, and intervals I = [0.2, 0.3] and J = [0.7, 0.8].
Consider any partition A defined by cut points 0 < k < ` < 1. Whenever  < 0.3, if A is  perfect
from the point of view of player 1, then the middle piece is worth
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[0, 0.2] [0.2, 0.3] [0.3, 0.7] [0.7, 0.8] [0.8, 1]
V1 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.2
V2 0.15 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.15
• less than 0.5− d/100−  for player 2 when k ≤ 0.2
• more than 0.5 + d/100 +  for player 2 when k ≥ 0.3.
By iteratively applying Lemma 5 with every cut query received, we obtain that no -perfect
partition can be found as long as  < 0.001 min{a, d}, where the a and d are the values of players
1, 2 for the intervals I, J maintained throughout execution. Since a, d get reduced by a factor of at
most 100 in every iteration, the number of rounds is Ω
(
log 1
)
.
D Moving Knife Protocols
A moving knife protocol may have a finite number of “steps” where each “step” is one of the
following: a Cut query, an Eval query, or a Moving Knife step. A moving knife step contains
several knives that move continuously across the cake as time passes, as well as several “triggers”,
which are functions of the positions of the knives and become zero when a target configuration has
been reached.
Definition 6. (An RW Moving Knife Step) There are a constant number K of Devices some
of which have a position on the cake and are called Knives and others can have arbitrary real values
and may be called Triggers. The devices are numbered 1 . . .K and each device j is controlled by a
player ij and has a real value xj that changes continuously as time proceeds from α to ω, where
0 ≤ α ≤ ω ≤ 1. Thus the value of each knife j (i.e. its position on the cake) is given by some
function xj(t) ∈ [0, 1], while the value of each trigger j is given by a function xj(t) ∈ <.
The first device is a knife with position equal to time, while the value of each additional device,
xj(t) = Fj (t, x1(t), . . . , xj−1(t)), may be obtained using at most ` RW queries to j’s owner. 9 The
value of a device may depend in an arbitrary way on any information about the players obtained
before the moving knife step 10, but its dependence on the time t and values of previous devices
x1(t) . . . xj−1(t) is Lipschitz continuous for all hungry valuations.
An outcome for the moving knife step is the index of a trigger j with different signs at α and
ω (i.e. xj(α) · xj(ω) ≤ 0), together with a time t such that xj(t) = 0, as well as the values of all
devices xj′(t) at t. (If the value of the trigger xj happens to be monotone then the time t is unique,
but in general there may be different such t and any one of them may be given.)
The information that a protocol retains after executing a moving knife step is the outcome of
the step. Moving knife steps cannot always be executed exactly in the RW model, in the sense
that it may take infinitely many queries to find a time where a trigger fires, so we will consider
instead approximations. An approximate outcome is such that for any trigger that switches signs
from the beginning to the end of time, we get a time and corresponding configuration (i.e. values
of all devices) at which the trigger approximately fires.
9The values of the devices, once determined, are known to all the players and the center.
10In the RW model, such information means cut points and value labels obtained through Cut queries, Evaluate
queries, or moving knife steps executed before the current one.
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Definition 7 (-Outcome). An -outcome of a moving knife step running from time α to ω with
devices 1 . . .K is the index of a trigger i that switches signs from α to ω (i.e. with xi(α)·xi(ω) ≤ 0),
together with a time t and approximate values x˜1(t) . . . x˜K(t) of all the devices at this time, so that
• xi(t) ∈ [−, ], and
• |x˜j(t)− xj(t)| ≤ , for all j = 1 . . .K.
An -outcome for an RW query is an answer to the query that is within  of the correct answer.
We can now define moving knife protocols in the RW model.
Definition 8 (RW Moving Knife Protocol). An RW moving knife protocol M consists of a
finite number of steps, each of which is a moving knife step or an RW query. 11 At the end of an
executionM outputs an allocation of the cake that depends on the outcomes of the steps it executed.
We also require robustness: 12 if M outputs F-fair allocations and completes in at most r steps
with a partition demarcated by C cuts, then for all  > 0, by iteratively replacing each outcome of a
step of M with an -outcome 13, M completes in at most r steps with an -F-fair partition using
at most C cuts.
D.1 Simulating General Moving Knife Protocols
Theorem D.1. Let M be an RW moving knife step for a cake cutting problem with hungry value
densities bounded from above and below by constants.
Then for each  > 0 and every trigger j ofM that switches signs from the start to the end time,
we can find an -outcome associated with this trigger using O
(
log 1
)
RW queries.
Proof. Let 1 . . .K be the devices of M, α and ω be the start and end times, k the Lipschitz
constant of the moving knife step, ∆ and δ the upper and lower bounds on the value densities,
where ∆ > δ > 0. Since the value densities are bounded by constants, the dependence functions of
the moving knives are k-Lipschitz, the number of devices is constant and each device is discovered
using at most a fixed number ` of RW queries given the values of previous devices, it follows that
11We count the answer to an RW query as part of that step.
12Without robustness, moving knife protocols can be very brittle, as can be seen from the following variant of
Austin’s procedure for n = 2 players: Player 1 slides a knife across the cake, from 0 to 1. For each position x of the
knife, player 1 positions a second knife at a point y for which V1(x, y) = 1/2. Player 2 is instructed to shout “Cut!”
when V2(x, y) = 1/2. Given positions x, y of the knives after their movement stops, if V1(x, y) = V2(x, y) = 1/2, then
player 2 is allocated [x, y] and player 1 the remainder, else player 1 receives the whole cake. Casting this procedure
in the moving knife framework, we have time running from 0 to 1 and three devices, where the first two devices are
the knives such that for any time t ∈ [0, 1], their positions are x1(t) = t and x2(t) = x1(t) + p(t), respectively, where
p(t) is the smallest point larger than t with V2(x1(t), x1(t) + p(t)) = 1/2, and the third device is a trigger with value
function x3(t) = V2(x, y)− 1/2. If the moving knife step is executed exactly, the procedure always outputs a perfect
allocation of the cake. The simulation theorem D.1 implies that, using O(log 1

) RW queries, we can replace the
outcome of the moving knife step with an -approximate one, consisting of two points x, y for which V1(x, y) = 1/2
and |V2(x, y)− 1/2| ≤ . But when replacing the exact outcome with the simulated one, we can no longer guarantee
that the condition for the first branch is met, and so the execution seen for some valuations will be the second branch,
where player 1 receives the whole cake.
13That is, if the first step is an RW query, then its answer is replaced with an approximate answer to the query,
and if it’s a moving knife step, it’s replaced with an -outcome of the step. Using this approximate information the
protocol then decides what its second step will be, which is also executed approximately, etc.
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there exists a constant ζ > max{1, k,∆} such that for any device i = 1 . . .K and times s < t,
where s, t ∈ [α, ω],
|xi(t)− xi(s)| ≤ ζ · |t− s|. (1)
We can simulate the moving knife step M as follows. Initialize the position of the first device
(knife) when the time is α and ω respectively, by setting a = x1(α) and b = x1(ω). Let j be any
trigger of M, where its values at time α and ω are y = xj(α) and y′ = xj(ω), respectively.
Iteratively, ask player 1 a Cut query to identify the cut at which the interval [a, b] is halved in
its estimation; that is, let w = (V1(a) + V1(b))/2 and z = Cut1(w). Intuitively this corresponds
to checking the configuration when half of the time has elapsed, but since there is no continuous
time in the RW model, we use the valuation of player 1 as a proxy. Since the position of the first
knife is equal to time, we have that t˜ = z is the time when M sets the first knife to position z.
By the conditions in the lemma, given the time t˜ and the position z of the first device at t˜, we
can iteratively find using at most ` RW queries the value of each device 2, . . . ,K, given the current
time and the values of the previous devices. Let xj(t˜) be the value attained by trigger j at position
z. If xj(t˜) · ya > 0, update y = z. Else, update y′ = z. Stop after 2 log
(
1
′
)
steps, where ′ = ·δζ .
Since the value of player 1 for the interval [a, b] halves with each iteration, we get that the final
interval [a, b] is very small in player 1’s estimation: |V1(a) − V1(b)| ≤ ′. The value densities of
the players are bounded from below by δ, thus |V1(a) − V1(b)| ≥ δ|a − b|, which implies |a − b| ≤
1/δ · |V1(a) − V1(b)| ≤ ′/δ. Let s = a and t = b denote the times at which the first knife has
positions a and b, respectively. Then |a− b| = |t− s|. By inequality 1, for each device i:
|xi(s)− xi(t)| ≤ ζ · |t− s| ≤ 
This inequality holds in particular for device j, case in which |y − y′| = |xj(s) − xj(t)| < .
There are two cases left. If y > 0 and y′ < 0, then 0 < y ≤ y′ +  < , and we can return the time
s and the values of the devices at time s, x1(s) . . . xK(s). Otherwise, y < 0 and y
′ > 0, and so
0 < y′ < y +  < , case in which we return time t and device values x1(t) . . . xK(t). Thus for each
trigger j we can find an approximate solution with O
(
log 1
)
RW queries, such that the positions
of the other devices are also -close to their positions at a nearby time where trigger j is exactly
zero. This completes the proof.
We can simulate RW moving knife protocols in the RW model as follows.
Theorem D.2. [7.1 in main text] Consider a cake cutting problem where the value densities are
bounded from above and below by strictly positive constants. LetM be an RW moving knife protocol
with at most r steps, such that M outputs F-fair allocations demarcated by at most a constant
number C of cuts.
Then for each  > 0, there is an RW protocol M that uses O
(
log 1
)
queries and computes
-F-fair partitions demarcated with at most C cuts.
Proof. The proof is immediate given the simulation theorem D.1, which guarantees that we can
replace each moving knife step of M with an -outcome using O(log 1 ) RW queries. Since F is
robust, the approximate fairness of the simulated protocol follows.
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D.2 Simulating Existing Moving Knife Protocols
The moving knife procedures from the literature include the Dubins-Spanier procedure (which is
in fact equivalent to a discrete RW protocol), Austin’s procedure for computing perfect alloca-
tions, Austin’s extension, which finds for n = 2 players a partition into k pieces such that each
piece is worth 1/k to both players, and several procedures for computing envy-free allocations due
to Barbanel-Brams, Stromquist, Webb, Brams-Taylor-Zwicker [RW98, BT96] and Saberi-Wang
[SW09].
Theorem D.3. [7.2 in main text] The Austin, Austin’s extension, Barbanel-Brams, Stromquist,
Webb, Brams-Taylor-Zwicker, and Saberi-Wang moving knife procedures can be simulated with
O
(
log 1
)
RW queries when the value densities are bounded from above and below by positive con-
stants.
Proof. Let ∆ ≥ δ > 0 be the upper and lower bounds on the valuations, respectively. First note that
all these procedures have a constant number of players, their moving knife steps have a constant
number of devices, and the first device is a knife held by the referee, the position of which is equal
to the time. The dependence functions of the known protocols are in the case of the triggers, simple
linear functions (that trivially meet the Lipschitz condition) of the form Vi(S) − Vi(T ) for some
player i and pieces S, T , and in the case of each knife, the outcomes of a Cut query, where the
value given to the query is equal to the value of a player for some demarcated interval. Finally,
we can reach within /∆ the same positions of the knives as in the continuous procedure, thus
approximating within  the value of each player for every piece demarcated by two adjacent knives.
• Austin’s procedure. We will use several steps, each of which is an RW query or a moving knife
step, as follows. The first step of Austin’s procedure is discrete, and can be implemented with a
Cut query in the RW model, in which player 1 is asked to cut the cake in half; let z = Cut1(0.5).
Then ask player 2 to evaluate the generated piece: α = Eval2(z). If α = 0.5, we have found an
exact perfect allocation. Otherwise, w.l.o.g. assume V2(0, z) < 0.5 (the other case is similar). We
construct a moving knife step with three devices, where the first device will be a knife and represents
the value of the referee knife. Its value (i.e. position) is equal to the time that has elapsed as long
as the time is less than z, and equal to z otherwise. The second device is also a knife, and its value
can be obtained with an Eval and Cut query to player 1 as follows: let v = Eval1(z) and set the
value of the second knife to p = Cut1(0.5+v). The third device is a trigger and its value is equal to
V1(z, p), which can be obtained with a single evaluation query to player 2, Eval2(z, p). Note that
K = 3 and ` = 2, where K is the number of devices and ` the number of queries required to find
the value of a device given the values of the previous devices. By Lemma D.1, we can simulate the
procedure in the RW model to find a configuration where the trigger has value zero with O
(
log 1
)
queries, which corresponds to an -perfect allocation.
• Austin’s extension [BT96, RW98]. This moving knife procedure is an extension of Austin’s
procedure for n = 2 players, which finds a partition into k pieces A = (A1, . . . , Ak) into k pieces,
such that Vi(Aj) = 1/k for each i = 1, 2, k = 1 . . . k. The procedure works as follows. Initialize
` = k. Alice makes `− 1 cuts that divide the cake into ` intervals, each worth 1/k to Alice. Then
there is a piece that Bob values at (weakly) less than 1/k, and an adjacent piece that Bob values
at (weakly) more than 1/k. Then the referee places a knife at the boundary of one of the pieces
and Alice places a second knife so that the interval between the two knives is worth 1/k to her.
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The knives are moved continuously, keeping Alice’s value for the piece between them at /1k, until
meeting the cut points of the other piece. By the intermediate value theorem, there is a point where
Bob agrees that the piece between the knives is worth exactly 1/k. Append this piece to the final
allocation, update ` = `− 1, and repeat the procedure on the remainder of the cake.
For fixed k, this procedure contains a constant number of discrete RW queries and moving knife
steps that are very similar to Austin’s procedure, which can be simulated approximately.
• Barbanel-Brams procedure. The first steps of this procedure consist of RW queries, which are
already in the RW model. Afterwards, we branch in two cases, each of which is a moving knife
step. For each such step, we keep track of six devices. We illustrate case 1: the first device is
the knife (corresponding to the referee’s knife) with position x1(t) = t, the second device is also a
knife, the position x2(t) of which is determined by asking player 1 a Cut query, the third device is a
trigger with valuation determined by player 2’s estimation of the difference between pieces [0, x1(t)]
and [x1(t), x2(t)] (i.e. V2(0, x1(t)) − V1(x1(t), x2(t))), the fourth device is a trigger with valuation
V2(x1(t), x2(t)) − V2(x2(t), 1), the fifth and sixth devices are triggers similar to triggers three and
four, with the difference that their values are determined by player 3 instead of player 2.
• Webb, Brams-Taylor-Zwicker, Saberi-Wang [BT96, RW98, SW09]: The Webb procedure
computes an envy-free allocation among n = 3 players and uses as subroutines the Dubins-Spanier
protocol, which can be implemented exactly in the RW model, and Austin’s extension, which can
be simulated approximately as discussed. The Brams-Taylor-Zwicker protocol uses two calls to
Austin’s procedure, which can be simulated approximately since the protocol is robust; the same
is true of the Saberi-Wang procedure, which also uses Austin’s procedure as a subroutine.
• Stromquist’s procedure [RW98]: In this case we will need more complex dependence functions.
The procedure is as follows:
A referee continuously moves a knife from 0 to 1. For each position x of the referee knife,
every player i positions their own knife at their midpoint mi of the piece [x, 1]. Denote
y = median(m1,m2,m3). Each player i is instructed to shout stop when Vi(0, x) =
max{Vi(x, y), Vi(y, 1)}. When that happens, the cake is allocated as follows: the player
i that called stop receives the piece [0, x], the player j with the mark mj ≤ y receives the
piece [x, y], while the remaining player receives the piece [y, 1].
We can implement the procedure as a single moving knife step in our framework using four knives
and four triggers as follows. The first knife has a position x1(t) equals to time and runs from 0 to 1.
Each knife k = 2, 3, 4 is positioned by player k− 1 as a result of a cut query Cutk−1(αk−1 + βk−1),
where αk−1 = Evalk−1(x1(t)) and βk−1 =
1−αk−1
2 .
The first three triggers are devices 5, 6, 7, one for each player k = 1, 2, 3, such that xk+4(t) =
Vk(0, x1(t))−max {Vk (x1(t), y) , Vk(y, 1)}. The fourth trigger is the eighth device with the following
dependence function:
(a) If xi(t) < 0 for i = 5 . . . 7, let x8(t) = mini=5...7{xi(t)}.
(b) Else, if xi(t) > 0 for i = 5 . . . 7, sort the triggers by j, k, `, such that xj(t) ≥ xk(t) ≥ x`(t).
Define x8(t) = xk(t) + x`(t).
(c) Else, if xi(t) ≤ 0 for some trigger i ∈ {5, 6, 7} and xj(t) ≥ 0 for all j ∈ {5, 6, 7} \ {i}, define
x8(t) = minj∈{5,6,7}\{i} xj(t).
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(d) Else, let x8(t) = 0. (In this case, we have xi(t) ≥ 0 for some trigger i and xj(t) ≤ 0 for all
j ∈ {5, 6, 7} \ {i}.)
Clearly the positions of the knives are continuous in time since the median function is continuous.
The value of the first triggers are simple linear functions of the valuations for the pieces demarcated
by knives and are continuous. The value of the fourth trigger can also be seen to be continuous by
checking the combinations of switching points indicated by the four cases in its definition. Moreover,
we have that x8(0) = −0.5 < 0 and x8(1) = 2 > 0. Thus there exists a time when the trigger is
exactly zero. To simulate this moving knife step, the search strategy is that when the trigger value
is negative, we must move the referee knife to the right, and when the trigger value is positive, to
the left.
Now suppose we have a time t at which the eighth trigger is approximately zero, i.e. − ≤
x8(t) ≤ . Let y be the median at this time. If case (a) holds at time t, then there exists a player
i such that − ≤ wi − Vi(0, x1(t)) ≤ . Give player i the piece [0, x1(t)]. Let j 6= i be the player
whose knife is less than or equal to the median and k the remaining player, whose knife is greater
than or equal to the median. Then give player j the piece [x1(t), y] and player k the piece [y, 1].
In case (b), since Vi(0, x1(t)) > wi for all i and x8(t) ∈ [−, ], we have |Vk(0, x1(t)) − wk| ≤ 
and |V`(0, x1(t))−w`| ≤ . W.l.o.g, let j be the player in {j, k} whose knife is less than or equal to
the median. Then give [0, x1(t)] to player k, [x1(t), y] to player j, and [y, 1] to player `.
In case (c), let j 6= i be the player with an approximate tie (i.e. |Vj(0, x1(t)) − wj | ≤ ) and
k 6= i, j the remaining player, with Vk(0, x1(t)) ≥ wk. Let k take the piece [0, x1(t)]. If the position
of player i’s knife is to the left of y, the allocation in which player i takes the piece [x1(t), y] and
player j takes [y, 1] is envy-free. If player i’s knife is located at y, let player j pick its favorite
between [x1(t), y] and [y, 1], while player k takes the remainder. If player i’s knife is located to the
right of y, let player j take [x1(t), y] and player i the piece [y, 1].
In case (d), give player i the piece [0, x1(t)]. An envy-free allocation can be obtained by giving
the piece [x1(t), y] to the player whose knife is less than or equal to y, and the remaining player
the piece [y, 1]. This completes the proof.
Note that our previous simulations of the Barbanel-Brams and Austin procedures do not require
that the valuations are bounded at all, since we use the specific formulations of the value functions
of the triggers to eliminate the players one by one from consideration. This is not necessarily
possible when the dependence functions of the devices are more complex.
An Equitable Protocol. Next we show a simple moving knife step in the Robertson-Webb model
for computing equitable allocations for any number of hungry players, which can be implemented
with n+ 1 devices, one of which is a trigger and the remainder of n are knives. This moving knife
step illustrates a trigger whose valuation function depends on time and the physical location of the
knives (rather than the values of the players for the pieces demarcated by the knives, as is common
in the previous examples).
A more complex moving knife procedure for computing exact equitable allocations that is not
in the RW model but works even when the valuations are not hungry was discovered independently
by [SHS17]. Their protocol is based on the same idea of multiple knives moving in parallel and
has more steps designed to detect regions valued at zero by some players. Note the existence of
connected equitable allocations for any order of the players was established by Cechlarova, Dobos,
and Pillarova [CDP13], with a simplified proof based on the Borsuk-Ulam theorem given by Cheze
[Che17].
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Equitable Protocol : Player 1 slides a knife continuously across the cake, from 0 to
1. For each position x1 of the knife, player 1 is asked for its value of the piece [0, x1];
then each player i = 2 . . . n iteratively positions its own knife at a point xi ∈ [xi−1, 1]
with Vi(xi−1, xi) = V1(0, x1) if possible, and at xi = 1 otherwise.
Player n shouts “Stop!” when its own knife reaches the right endpoint of the cake (i.e.,
xn = 1). The cake is allocated in the order 1 . . . n, with cuts at x1 . . . xn−1.
Theorem D.4. [7.3 in main text] There is an RW moving knife protocol that computes connected
equitable allocation for any number of n hungry players.
Proof. We first note the protocol consists in fact a single moving knife step. We first note that
given the position of the first knife, the value of player 1 for the piece [0, x1], a = V1(0, x1), can
be obtained with an Eval query, and the position of each knife j = 2 . . . n can be obtained from
the position of knife j − 1 by using an Eval query addressed to player j for the piece [0, xj−1], i.e.
b := Evalj(xj−1), followed by a Cut query: Cutj(a + b). Also, at every point in time, the knives
are positioned as to give an equitable allocation on the subset [0, xn] of the cake.
To implement this moving knife step in the framework of Definition 6, we will use n+ 1 devices
and time running from α = 0 to ω = 1. The first n devices are knives, in the order 1 . . . n, such that
the position of knife i depends on knives 1 . . . i− 1, while device n+ 1 will be a trigger with values
of different signs at time 0 and 1, respectively, and that will fire (i.e. turn zero) when an exact
equitable allocation is reached. To define the value function for the trigger, consider a (hypothetical)
augmented resource, of length n, where the valuations of the players on [1, n] are uniform and on
[0, 1] are as defined in the actual instance. From the Cut and Eval queries in the actual moving
knife step, the center can maintain throughout time the positions of some fictitious knives on the
hypothetical cake, y1(t) . . . yn(t), which are always positioned in an equitable configuration; that
is, y1(t) = x1(t), while y2(t) . . . yn(t) are iteratively set such that V1(0, y1(t)) = Vi(yi−1(t), yi(t)).
Then at time t = 0 we have y1(0) = . . . = yn(0) = 0, while at time t = 1 we have y1(1) = 1, y2(1) =
2, . . . , yn(1) = n. Define the value function of the trigger as f(t) = yn(t) − 1. Then f(0) = −1
and f(1) = n− 1. Since f(t) is continuous, by the intermediate value theorem there exists a time t
when f(t) = 0, which corresponds to yn(t) = 1. Thus the protocol is a moving knife step as defined
in Definition 6 and computes a connected equitable allocation of the whole cake. This completes
the proof.
E The Stronger and Weaker RW Models
We also formalize two other query models. The first one, which we call RW+, differs in that the
inputs to evaluate queries need not be previous cut points and the protocol can use arbitrary points
to demarcate the final allocation. Our lower bounds carry over for this model.
Definition 9 (RW+ query model). An RW+ protocol for cake cutting communicates with the
players via two types of queries:
• Cuti(α): Player i cuts the cake at a point y where Vi([0, y]) = α, for any α ∈ [0, 1].
• Evali(y): Player i returns Vi([0, y]), for any y ∈ [0, 1].
At the end of execution an RW+ protocol outputs an allocation that can be demarcated by any
points (regardless of whether they are previous cut points or not).
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Another natural model, that we call RW−, has only one type of query that the protocol can
ask the players.
Definition 10 (RW− query model). An RW− protocol for cake cutting communicates with the
players via queries of the form
• Evali(y): Player i returns Vi([0, y]), where y ∈ [0, 1] is arbitrarily chosen by the center.
At the end an RW− protocol outputs an allocation that can be demarcated by any points.
The upper and lower bounds for envy-free, perfect, and equitable allocations also hold in the
RW+ model as a corollary of the proofs in the RW model.
Corollary 3. Computing a connected -envy-free allocation for n ≥ 3 players in the RW+ model
requires Ω
(
log 1
)
queries.
Proof. Let  > 0 and P a protocol in the RW+ model. The main observation that allows us to
conclude the extension of the bound to the RW+ model is that in Lemma 4, if during the execution
of P a player gets an Evaluate query Evali(y) for some arbitrary point y, then
• if y is outside the hidden intervals (in which the cuts of the envy-free allocation reside), the
query can be answered in the same way as in the RW model, and
• if y is inside one of the hidden intervals, then it can be handled as a Cuti(y) query in the
RW model. Thus any RW+ protocol P does not manage to reduce the length of the hidden
interval by more than a factor of 100 with each query.
Denote by I1 . . . In−1 the hidden intervals (in which the envy-free cut points lie) after P has
finished issuing queries, where Ij = [xj , yj ] for all j. By the way the intervals are maintained during
P’s execution, there are no cuts inside any Ij . Suppose P uses a cut x∗ ∈ (xj , yj) to demarcate the
pieces of two players adjacent in the final allocation, A. Then an adversary can set Vi([xj , x
∗]) = 0.
Thus the only way that A can be -envy-free is if there exists an -envy-free allocation A′ that does
not use cuts inside Ij . Thus an RW
+ protocol has no advantage over an RW protocol.
Corollary 4. Computing an -perfect allocation for n = 2 players in the RW+ model requires
Ω
(
log 1
)
queries.
Proof. The proof follows from the observation that Lemma 5 holds in the RW+ model too. If the
uniform intervals maintained in the lemma are I = [x, x+ a] and J = [y, y + a], with y = x+ 0.5,
then any evaluate query outside the intervals I, J can be handled in the usual way (consistent
with history). If an evaluate query is received inside one of I, J , let Evali(s) denote the query. If
s ∈ (x, x + a/2], this can be handled as Case 1.a in Lemma 5, while if s ∈ (x + a/2, x), it can be
handled as Case 1.b in Lemma 5. Also note that if the final interval I is not worth less than  to
both players, an -perfect allocation cannot be found using additional arbitrary cuts inside I, J .
Corollary 5. Computing an -equitable allocation for n = 2 players in the RW+ model requires
Ω
(
log 1
)
queries.
Proof. The proof follows from the observation that Lemma 7 also holds in the RW+ model, by
noting that any evaluate query Evali(s), where s is not a previous cut point, can be handled in
the same way as a Cut query.
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In the RW+ model, the proofs for simulating moving knife steps and procedures are the same
except that we do not need the valuations to be bounded from below since the center can reduce
(half) the time directly with each iteration (instead of reducing it through the lens of the players’
valuations). We get the simulations:
Theorem E.1. Let M be an RW+ moving knife step for a cake cutting problem where the players
have hungry value densities upper bounded by a constant D > 0.
Then for each  > 0 and every trigger j of M that switches signs from the beginning to the
end of time that M runs, we can find an -outcome associated with trigger j using O (log 1 ) RW+
queries.
Theorem E.2. Consider a cake cutting problem where the value densities are bounded from above
by constant D > 0. Let M be an RW+ moving knife protocol with at most r steps, such that M
outputs F-fair allocations demarcated by at most a constant number C of cuts.
Then for each  > 0, there is an RW+ protocol M that uses O
(
log 1
)
queries and computes
-F-fair partitions demarcated with at most C cuts.
We also introduce a weaker model, which we call RW−, where the protocol can ask the players
only the evaluate type of query.
Definition 11 (RW− query model). An RW− protocol for cake cutting communicates with the
players via queries of the form
• Evali(y): Player i returns Vi([0, y]), where y ∈ [0, 1] is arbitrarily chosen by the center.
At the end an RW− protocol outputs an allocation that can be demarcated by any points.
If the valuations are arbitrary, then an RW− protocol may be unable to find any fair allocation
at all. The reason is that no matter what queries an RW− protocol asks, one can hide the entire
instance in a small interval that has value 1 for all the players; this interval will shrink as more
queries are issued, but can be set to remain of non-zero length until the end of execution.
However, if the valuations are bounded from above14, then an RW− protocol is quite powerful.
Theorem E.3. Suppose the valuations of the players are bounded from above by a constant D > 0.
Then any RW+ query can be answered within -error using O(log 1 ) RW
− queries.
Proof. Let there be an instance with arbitrary valuations v1 . . . vn such that vi(x) < D for all
x ∈ [0, 1] and i ∈ N . Since an RW− protocol can use the same type of evaluate queries as an RW+
protocol, the simulation has to handle the case where the incoming query is a cut. Let this be
Cuti(α) and denote by x the correct answer to the query. In order to find an approximate answer
using only evaluate queries, initialize ` = 0, r = 1, and search for the correct answer:
1. Let m = (`+ r)/2.
2. Ask player i the query Evali(m) and let w be the answer given. If |w − α| ≤ , return m.
3. Otherwise, if m > α, set r = m, and if m < α, set ` = m; return to step 1.
14There exist other types of valuations on which the RW− model may be useful, such as piecewise constant
valuations defined on a grid, with the demarcations between intervals of different height known to the protocol.
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